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Abstract
Today’s Internet is not transparent: when packets get lost or delayed, there is typically no infor-
mation about where the problem occurred, hence no information about who is responsible.
This results in Internet service providers (ISPs) offering service level agreements (SLAs) that
cannot be veriﬁed, and governments enacting neutrality regulations that cannot be enforced.
To remedy this, we propose a “transparency system,” where each participating network emits
receipts for trafﬁc it receives and delivers; an independent monitor collects these receipts and
makes decisions regarding the network’s performance and neutrality (or lack thereof). The
main challenge we face is misbehavior: On the one hand, a network that participates in such
a system has a clear incentive to game the system and inﬂuence the monitor’s decisions to
its advantage, by manipulating either the receipts it emits or the corresponding trafﬁc. On
the other hand, the monitor (or, more precisely, an adversary who has access to the same
information as the monitor, e.g., a government that has subpoenaed the monitor’s records)
may have an incentive to use the receipts emitted by a network in order to infer information
that is otherwise private to the network, in particular, its internal topology. We make three
contributions, each one to prevent a different type of misbehavior: (1) Incentive-compatible
reporting, which ensures that networks have no incentive to manipulate the receipts they emit
in order to claim better performance or fake neutrality. The key to our solution is a trade-off
that we discover between network performance and neutrality: we design our system such
that the more a network tries to exaggerate its estimated performance the more likely it is to
be perceived to violate neutrality (and vice versa). (2) Unbiased reporting, which ensures that
networks cannot manipulate the trafﬁc for which they emit receipts in order to claim better
performance. The key to our solution is delayed disclosure: we design receipt generation
such that, by the time a network has all the information it needs to emit a correct receipt, the
network has already forwarded the trafﬁc that this receipt concerns, hence cannot manipulate
it. (3) Topology-obfuscation reporting, which enables networks to emit the information that is
necessary for the monitor to make correct decisions without leaking any information about
internal network topology. The key to our solution is the observation that topology inference
exploits the diversity of pairwise similarities between the delay vectors of different network
paths; hence, we design receipt generation such that any delay vectors that the monitor might
compute have almost 0 pairwise similarities. We conclude that it is possible to design a trans-
parency system that enables networks to report on their own performance such that networks
have no incentive to game the system and no fear of leaking information about their private
topology.
v
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Résumé
Aujourd’hui Internet n’est pas transparent : lorsque des paquets sont perdus ou retardés, il
n’y a typiquement aucune information concernant la cause du problème et par conséquent
nulle indication quand à qui en est responsable. Ceci entraine une entente entre Fournisseurs
de Service Internet sur des Accords de Niveau de Services qui ne peuvent pas être vériﬁés, et
des gouvernements promulguant des lois dictant la neutralité qui ne peuvent pas être appli-
quées. Pour remédier à cela nous proposons un "système de transparence" où chaque réseau
participant émet des reçus pour le traﬁque qu’il reçoit et fournit. Un moniteur indépendant
collecte ces reçus et décide du niveau de performance et de neutralité du réseau. La difﬁculté
principale à laquelle nous faisons face sont les comportements frauduleux : D’une part, un
réseau appartenant à un tel système a clairement un intérêt à fausser les données et inﬂuencer
la décision du moniteur pour améliorer le résultat en son avantage, en manipulant les reçus
émis ou le traﬁque correspondant. D’autre part, le moniteur (ou plutôt un adversaire qui a
accès aux mêmes informations que le moniteur, par exemple un gouvernement qui requière
par mandat l’accès aux données du moniteur) peut avoir un intérêt à utiliser les reçus émis par
un réseau aﬁn de déduire des informations normalement privées et en particulier sa topologie.
Nous réalisons trois contributions, chacune pour prévenir un type de comportement fraudu-
leux différent : Le rapport compatible à la motivation, qui assure que les réseaux n’ont pas
d’intérêt à manipuler les reçus qu’il émettent aﬁn de justiﬁer une meilleure performance ou
une fausse neutralité. La clé de notre solution est un compromis que nous découvrons entre
la performance du réseau et la neutralité : nous concevons notre système de manière à ce que
plus un réseau ampliﬁe sa performance estimée, plus il sera passible d’être reconnu comme
transgressant la neutralité (et vice versa). Le rapport impartial, qui garantie que les réseaux
ne peuvent pas manipuler le traﬁque pour lequel ils émettent des reçus aﬁn de déclarer une
meilleure performance. La clé de notre solution est la divulgation retardée : nous concevons
la création de reçus de telle manière que le temps que le réseau reçoive toute l’information
dont il a besoin pour émettre un bon reçu, le réseau a déjà traité le traﬁque correspondant à
ce reçu et donc ne peut plus le fausser. Le rapport opaque de topologie, qui permet au réseau
d’émettre les informations nécessaires au moniteur pour prendre les bonnes décisions sans
révéler aucune information concernant la topologie interne du réseau. La clé de notre solution
est le constat que la déduction de topologie utilise la diversité des similarités de toute paire
de vecteurs de retard entre différents chemins de réseaux. Par conséquent, nous créons le
système aﬁn que les vecteurs de retard que le moniteur pourrait calculer présentent presque
0-similarités de paire.
vii
Mots-clés: Transparence du réseau, échantillonnage consistant, divulgation différée, rapports
de performance ﬁables, théorie des mécanismes d’incitation, inférence de topologie du réseau.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The need for transparency
Today’s Internet offers no transparency on the fate of forwarded trafﬁc. When packets get lost
or delayed, there is typically no information about where the problem occurred, hence no
information about who is responsible.
The lack of transparency results in service level agreements (SLAs) and neutrality regulations
that cannot be enforced: First, Internet service providers (ISPs) guarantee that their network
will honor a minimum delivery rate (equivalently, a maximum loss rate) and a maximum
latency [11, 3, 8], even though there exists no systematic way to estimate their loss rate or
delay distribution. Second, governments require that ISPs should not (de)prioritize certain
trafﬁc classes, even though there exists no systematic way to detect trafﬁc (de)prioritization;
42 governments have already adopted such neutrality regulations or laws, while 6 more are
considering them [9, 50, 21, 7]. However, due to the lack of veriﬁable evidence, ISPs can deny
any accusation of following anti-competitive practices, such as blocking or degrading the
performance of competing services on their networks [5, 2, 4].
We argue that the requisition for a transparency framework is now necessary. If network users
and governments care enough for SLAs and neutrality regulations to exist, then there should be
a systematic way to enforce them in practice. A veriﬁable measurement system that provides
trustworthy loss and latency information would reveal to consumers and regulators how
ISPs manage trafﬁc, and it would lead to better-informed legal and policy decisions [52, 44].
Moreover, it would offer a quantitative economic incentive to the ISPs to innovate [41].
We support the idea of a “network-layer transparency system” [12, 13, 15, 60, 14, 62, 61, 52, 45],
where each participating network emits receipts for trafﬁc it receives and delivers. The receipts
are crafted such that an independent monitor can process them and estimate each network’s
mean loss rate and delay distribution quantiles with respect to various trafﬁc aggregates,
enabling the veriﬁcation of both SLAs and neutrality regulations. Networks participate either
because they are expected to by their governments, or (our preferred scenario) by their own
1
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Domain Y Domain Z
Domain X Domain W
Monitor
R R R R 
Figure 1.1 – Example network model. The black dashed lines denote the intra-domain routes between
an ingress and an egress node of a domain; and the black solid lines denote the inter-domain links. The
blue dotted lines show the receipts that are emitted to the monitor. The red line shows an example
end-to-end packet ﬂow from a source to a destination domain.
choice, because producing veriﬁable evidence of honoring SLAs and network neutrality is
good for their reputation. Today, even if an ISP wants to produce such veriﬁable evidence,
e.g., to defend itself against wrongful suspicion of SLA or neutrality violation, it has no way of
doing it.
A critical challenge is resistance to misbehavior: a network that reports on its own performance
has a clear incentive to try to game the estimation to its advantage. Transparency, however,
demands a truthful performance evaluation that is resilient against any effort of unscrupulous
domains to abuse it and exaggerate their performance. Any misbehavior has to be either
avoided or detected and extracted from the measurement process. In this dissertation, we
address this challenge without trusted hardware.
1.2 Deﬁnitions
A “domain” is a contiguous network area managed by a single administrative entity, e.g., an
ISP, an Autonomous System (AS), an Internet eXchange Point (IXP), an enterprise or campus
network, the data-center network of a content provider.
Each domain that participates in our system deploys a special “node” at each point where
it exchanges trafﬁc with another domain (Fig. 1.1). Each node runs an algorithm that takes
as input a set of conﬁguration parameters and the sequence of packets arriving at the node,
and outputs a sequence of receipts that it sends to the monitor. The nodes are co-located
with the border routers of the domains, and we use the terms "node" and "border router"
interchangeably.
A “monitor” is a logically centralized entity that collects the receipts emitted by the partici-
pating domains and uses them to answer performance and neutrality questions about the
2
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domains. The monitor could be owned and managed by the participating domains themselves
(in which case it would be implemented as a decentralized system), or it could be owned and
managed by a single authority (like those that manage the root DNS servers). In the latter case,
anyone interested in the receipts (e.g., the participating domains or their customers) would
gain access to them through the owning authority.
We deﬁne two kinds of trafﬁc units: “ﬂows” and “aggregates”:
• A ﬂow is the set of all packets observed by a node that have the same source and
destination IP preﬁx.
• An aggregate is a set of packets with some common observable characteristic, e.g., the
set of packets from a given source to a given destination domain, or all BitTorrent packets
from a given source domain; so, an aggregate may be a ﬂow’s subset or contain one or
multiple ﬂows.
A ﬂow/aggregate’s “path” is the sequence of all nodes that observe its trafﬁc; a ﬂow/aggregate’s
“source node” is the ﬁrst node on its path.
Nodes can classify packets per ﬂow, but are not aware of aggregates.
The monitor, on the other hand, deﬁnes and answers questions with respect to aggregates,
based on loss and/or delay “estimates”, e.g. the average loss rate or delay between two nodes,
the delay variance or some important percentile of it, etc. When we talk about the "accuracy"
of an estimate computed by the monitor, we mean (γ,)-accuracy, where γ is the lower bound
of the probability (or conﬁdence level) that the relative estimation error is . This is a standard
accuracy metric for loss estimates and was recently deﬁned for delay estimates as well [55, 42].
To determine which receipts are relevant to a given aggregate (hence should be taken into
account to answer questions w.r.t. that aggregate), the monitor may need help from the
aggregate’s source node. For example, if the monitor deﬁnes an aggregate as all the BitTorrent
packets from a given source domain, then it needs help from that source domain to determine
which are the relevant receipts. By design (and for reasons we explain later), the nodes that
produce the receipts are not aware of aggregates, hence cannot tag receipts with aggregate-
related information.
1.3 Problem and Goals
We describe our problem and goals in two parts. This is because, in our context, there are two
kinds of entities, the domains and the monitor(s), which play distinct roles.
[Part I – Domains]: Given the trafﬁc they observe, the domains should emit receipts in a way
that guarantees:
• Low resource usage.
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• Topology privacy.
The ﬁrst objective comes from the fact that the receipts are produced at border routers, which
are already burdened with supporting line rates of tens of Gbps and increasing numbers of
protocol suites.
The second objective comes from the fact that receipts may leak information about a domain
that is otherwise private: it has been shown that an entitywith access to network-pathmeasure-
ments can infer network topology through network tomography [30, 29, 56, 19, 28, 26, 27, 57].
Hence, from the point of view of a domain, the monitor (or any entity that has access to the
monitor’s data) may misbehave and try to use the domain’s receipts to infer the domain’s
internal topology.
To address this part of the problem, we set two goals for our design:
G1: The algorithm running on each node should be lightweight: it should not increase the
node’s data-to-control-path bandwidth and data-path memory by more than a few per-
centage points.
G2: The receipts emitted by a domain should be privacy preserving: they should not reveal
information about the domain’s internal topology that is otherwise secret.
[Part II – Monitor]: Given the emitted receipts, the monitor should be able to answer perfor-
mance and neutrality questions about the domains. We distinguish two steps in this process:
• Statistical estimation, i.e., the computation of statistics that summarize each domain’s
packet loss and delay distributions (e.g. mean, variance, or distribution percentiles).
• Decision making, i.e., the way in which the estimates are used to characterize domain
performance and neutrality.
Consider, for example, Fig. 1.1. Based on the receipts emitted by the nodes, the monitor ﬁrst
computes loss and delay statistics about the domains. Then, based on these statistics, the
monitor tries to answer the following questions: How does Y’s loss and delay performance
compare to W’s with respect to X-to-Z trafﬁc? Are Y and W treating all X-to-Z trafﬁc the same,
or are they discriminating against video trafﬁc?
From the point of view of the monitor, nodes (and the domains that own them) may strate-
gically misbehave: a node may try to manipulate the contents of the receipts, or the way it
forwards trafﬁc to which the receipts refer, so that the decisions made by the monitor are in
favor of a domain. Such manipulation may be practiced either independently or in collusion
with another node, which may or may not belong to the same domain.
To address such misbehavior, we set another two goals for our design:
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G3: Themonitor’s statistical estimation should beunbiased: given an aggregateG , themonitor
should be able to estimate a domain’s loss/delay with respect to G with a desired (γ,)-
accuracy in a desired measurement interval T ; and no domain that observesG should be
able to bias the estimation by preferentially forwardingG or any part of it.
G4: The monitor’s decision making should be incentive-compatible: given an aggregate G ,
no domain that observes G should have the incentive to strategically manipulate the
contents of its receipts in order to exaggerate its reported performance or hide neutrality
violations. This should be resistant both to independent manipulation and collusion.
1.4 Contributions
We present a transparency system that is based on sampling. Participating networks emit
receipts for a small sample of the packets that they receive and deliver; based on these receipts,
the monitor produces point estimates about loss and delay that enable domain-performance
comparison and trafﬁc-discrimination (or non-neutrality) detection.
We start from consistent hash-based sampling [65, 25], for reasons that we explain in Chapter 2,
and we enhance it with three mechanisms to meet our goals G2–G4:
1. Incentive-compatible reporting (Chapter. 3), which incentivizes the domains not to
falsify the contents of the receipts in order to claim lower loss/latency or fewer neutrality
violations—instead, the domains maximize their estimated performance only if they
report it truthfully.
2. Unbiased reporting (Chapter. 4), which is a lightweight sampling algorithm that incen-
tivizes the domains not to treat sampled trafﬁc preferentially to claim lower loss/latency—
instead, the domains maximize their estimated performance only if they forward trafﬁc
legitimately.
3. Topology-obfuscation reporting (Chapter. 5), which enables the domains to emit all the
information that is necessary for the monitor to make correct decisions, without leaking
any information about its internal topology.
The resulting system also meets goal G1: Running our sampling algorithm requires modest
functionality that can be afforded by modern networks. The data-to-control-path bandwidth
is not increased by more than 1%, which is equal to the sampling probability and hence
conﬁgurable. Also, the data-path memory is not increased by more than a few percentage
points, e.g., it is less than 10MB for measuring trafﬁc volumes that exceed 600Mbps with
(0.95,±10%)-accuracy within 5 minutes, and it can be even less for larger time intervals.
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1.5 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions:
1. Domains may drop or delay trafﬁc, they may also misbehave in order to exaggerate their
reported performance or hide possible neutrality violations, but they do not undertake
other malicious actions like modifying, injecting, or replaying trafﬁc. These types of
attacks have been addressed in prior work [60, 61].
2. Domains know the true loss and delay of their own inter-domain links. For any given
aggregateG and any given domain z onG’s path, the neighbor domains of z know the
true loss/delay performance of their inter-domain link with z with respect toG ’s packets.
We believe that this is a reasonable assumption, because the domains that are adjacent
to an inter-domain link can always directly debug that link and measure the loss and
queuing delay it is experiencing. This assumption is used in Chapters 3 and 5.
3. The monitor employs standard statistical techniques to compute the accuracy of each
loss or delay estimate; to provide conﬁdence intervals, these techniques must assume
something about the nature of the loss/delay that is being estimated, and the typical
assumption is that loss/delay is either i.i.d. (independent identically distributed) across
all packets, or follows the Gilbert model [36]. This assumption is used in Chapter 3 to
design the neutrality detector (Section §3.4), and in Chapter 4 for the parametrization of
our system (Section §4.6).
4. The packet arrivals of each ﬂow form a stationary and ergodic process with a high
enough rate (e.g. at the order of OC-12 or higher) that ergodic convergence is achieved
in less than 100msec. The limitation resulting from this assumption is that we can-
not reason about aggregates that consist of relatively few packets/sec. We think that
this is acceptable given our motivation to enable the comparison of domain perfor-
mance and the veriﬁcation of neutrality regulations, which typically apply to relatively
large aggregates. This assumption is used in Chapter 4 for the proofs of Lemmas 4.4.1
and 4.5.1.
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In this chapter we describe and justify the starting point of our design: each node emits
receipts only for a small sample of the packets it observes. By using packet sampling, we take
an initial step toward meeting our goals: we enable a lightweight implementation (goal G1); we
enable the use of statistical estimation with well-established accuracy guarantees (goal G3); we
enable the monitor to deﬁne aggregates of interest without having to pre-inform the domains
about them (also related to goal G3). More speciﬁcally, we use pseudo-random hash-based
sampling [65, 25], because of its “consistency” feature, which leads to lower estimation errors
than classic random sampling and enables incentive-compatible reporting on packet-loss
events (goal G4).
We ﬁrst describe a very basic transparency system that is based on consistent sampling (§2.1),
and then explain why we chose it as our starting design point (§2).
2.1 Basic Transparency System
Each node emits a receipt for a small sample of packets, drawn from all the packets it observes.
Each receipt carries: a digest that uniquely identiﬁes the packet with high probability; a
timestamp that speciﬁes when the packet was observed at the node; and a ﬂow ID that
speciﬁes the packet’s source and destination preﬁx.
Instead of using classic random sampling, which lets the nodes independently pick their
samples over the observed packets, we use consistent hash-based sampling, in which all
nodes along a path sample consistently the same set of packets modulo loss: Each packet is
either sampled by all the nodes that observe it or by none of them [65, 25].
Consistent sampling relies on hashing the non-mutable contents of each observed packet and
sampling the packet if the outcome falls within a predetermined range. A hash function with
strong randomization properties results in almost uniform (pseudo-random) sampling, where
the sampling probability is determined by the range of the hash function. Alg. 1 shows a basic
hash-based sampling algorithm: When a packet p arrives at a node, the node ﬁrst applies a
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Algorithm 1 OnPacketArrival (p)
pˆ non-mutable content of packet p
Receipt() constructs a receipt
Hash() hash function with strong randomization properties
Range subset of Hash’s range
1: if Hash
(
pˆ
) ∈Range then
2: rec←Receipt(p,currentTime)
3: Emit receipt rec.
4: end if
hash function on a part of p’s non-mutable content (the non-mutable ﬁelds of the IP header
and a small part of the payload). If the outcome falls within a given range (line 1), then the
packet is considered as a sample and a receipt is constructed (line 2), using information from
p for computing the digest and the ﬂow ID, and the current time1 for the timestamp.
After having received all the receipts from the nodes, the monitor runs statistical-estimation
and decision-making processes. It estimates each domain’s performance with respect to an ag-
gregateG by identifying and comparing the sample receipts that the entry and exit nodes of the
domain emit for G’s packets. Obviously, the monitor may also estimate performance between
any two nodes that observe G . Assuming that the receipts correspond to a random sample
ofG’s packets, the monitor uses well-established unbiased and efﬁcient point estimators to
estimate summarizing statistics of the loss/delay distributions [42, 55].
2.2 Why sampling?
Sampling enables a lightweight implementation (goal G1) and provides a good starting point
towards unbiasability (goal G3):
First, a node is not required to emit receipts per packet or maintain per-aggregate or per-ﬂow
state on the data-path, as in other solutions [12, 35, 15, 32, 62, 46]. Thus, it has a signiﬁcantly
reduced equipment cost, as required by goal G1.
Second, assuming a random and representative sample, the monitor can estimate any sum-
marizing statistic about loss and delay distributions. This is because statistics provide us with
a variety of unbiased and efﬁcient point estimators about unknown population parameters
(such as the population mean, variance, or percentiles) and a well-established theory on their
accuracy (or conﬁdence level) [55, 42].
Third, sampling enables tuning the resource cost and accuracy with only one knob, the
sampling probability. The sampling probability determines the rate at which each node emits
receipts, hence the fraction of the node’s network bandwidth that is consumed by emitted
receipts. At the same time, the rate at which a domain z’s nodes emit receipts for an aggregate
1Clock synchronization can be achieved by NTP[47] or GPS.
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G determines the (γ,)-accuracy with which the monitor estimates z’s performance w.r.t.G in
a desired time interval—or, equivalently, the time interval in which the monitor estimates z’s
performance w.r.t.G with a desired (γ,)-accuracy. In our context, the sampling probabilities
that make sense are 1% or below, which are typically supported by modern routers [10].
Fourth, the monitor can deﬁne a trafﬁc aggregate without the consent of the domains that
carry the aggregate and without even pre-informing these domains what the aggregate is. This
is related to unbiasability (goal G3): Each node reports on a sample of packets drawn from all
the packets it observes, as opposed to reporting only on packets that belong to few speciﬁc
aggregates of interest. If we reactively conﬁgured the network to emit receipts only for an
aggregate G , e.g., in reaction to user suspicions that G is being throttled, then a dishonest
domain could change how it treatsG the moment it starts reporting on it. In fact, sampling
is the only approach we could think of where each domain reports on a small fraction of the
packets it observes, yet the monitor estimates the domain’s loss and delay with respect to an
aggregate without pre-informing the domain what the aggregate is. In contrast, approaches
based on "aggregation" and "sketching" [13, 32, 62] require consent from the involved domains
before the collection of statistics can start.
2.3 Why consistency?
Compared to random sampling, consistent sampling leads to lower estimation error and
provides a good starting point toward incentive-compatible reporting (goal G4):
First, for a given sample size, consistent sampling leads to lower estimation error than in-
dependent random sampling (in the weak sense). This happens because random samples
are not always “useful” for estimating performance; for example, suppose the extreme case
where the sample sets collected by the two consecutive nodes on a ﬂow’s path are distinct, i.e.
they refer to different packets, then there is no packet for which delay can be computed, and
the sample set for estimating statistics is empty. Instead, all consistent samples are useful,
because each sample offers information about the loss or delay that is actually experienced
between the two nodes. Since the performance of the estimation is directly related to the
sample size, it makes sense to use consistent sampling.
Second, independent random sampling enables a certain type of collusion: When each
node/domain is allowed to sample different packets, domains have both the incentive and the
opportunity to collude and trick the monitor: each domain samples, and produces receipts
for, the packets it happened to treat well; this way, all domains exaggerate their performance
without implicating each other. The only way to remove the incentive to collude is to expect
each domain to sample a speciﬁc set of packets, which are also sampled by the domain’s
neighbors.
Third, consistent sampling enables incentive-compatible reporting on loss events. Consider
for example a misbehaving domain, that forges its receipts to pretend that packet losses, w.r.t.
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a ﬂow F , do not occur in its internal network (while they actually do). If samples are consistent
among all nodes along F ’s path, then the best that the misbehaving domain can achieve with
its lies, is to shift the blame for the lost packets to an inter-domain link. Since an inter-domain
link is shared responsibility, such fake reporting does not exonerate the culprit; hence there is
no incentive for the domain to pursue it. Moreover, the liar will be exposed to the neighbor
that was implicated in its lies. In §3.4.2, we will examine closer this issue and leverage this
exposure to disincentivize fake receipts of lost packets.
Despite all its advantages, consistent, hash-based sampling is not enough to address all our
goals (§1.3); it needs to be equipped with mechanisms that ensure resistance to misbehavior.
In the next three chapters, wewill enhance consistent samplingwith properties that incentivize
honest reporting (Chap. 3) and unbiased sampling (Chap. 4), and enable topology obfuscation
(Chap. 5).
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In this chapter, we describe how to achieve goal G4: the monitor’s decision making should be
incentive-compatible. Each domain has an incentive to emit receipts that will lead the monitor
to make the “best” decisions for the domain. Therefore, we study “bad receipt” attacks, where
a misbehaving domain manipulates receipts in order to exaggerate its performance and/or
hide neutrality violations. One might expect that such an attack would trivially succeed (since
the monitor has no ground truth beyond the receipts emitted by the domains themselves).
We show that this is not the case: by using the proper decision metrics, we ensure that the
domains have an incentive to report truthfully. In particular, we design our mechanism such
that, to exaggerate its performance, a domain must either falsely blame one of its neighbors
and get caught; or appear to violate neutrality (more than it actually does).
We ﬁrst present the attack and trust model (§3.2); then we formalize the decision-making
process by introducing decision and rating functions (§3.3); and ﬁnally we describe the tools
that enable truthful reporting and our approach (§3.4).
3.1 Notation
As stated in the introduction (§1.3), the monitor performs two kinds of processes: statistical
estimation, where it estimates loss and delay statistics for which there exists an efﬁcient point
estimator (e.g., average loss rate, average delay, delay variance, some important percentile
of delay); and decision making, where it uses the estimates to make a decision about a given
domain’s performance w.r.t. a given aggregate.
Let: A denote the set of possible decisions that the monitor may make about a given domain
and a given aggregate; Sz denote the set of all estimates that the monitor computes based on
the receipts emitted by domain z for a given aggregateG ; S denote the set of all estimates that
the monitor computes based on the receipts emitted by all the participating domains and for
all aggregates.
There are two things to keep in mind about S and Sz : First, if Z is the set of all domains, then
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×z∈Z Sz ⊂ S, because S includes estimates computed based on the receipts emitted by domains
other than z and for aggregates other than G . Second, both sets may include manipulated
estimates, because they are based on receipts emitted by the nodes, which may be honest or
misbehaving, depending on their chosen strategies.
Deﬁnition 3.1.1. A function fG : S →A is called a decision function about aggregate G.
Each decision that the monitor makes about domain z and aggregateG results in a rating of
domain z w.r.t.G , which represents the utility that z gains because of the monitor’s decision.
In general, rating could be one-dimensional or multi-dimensional, i.e., it could be expressed
by either a single number, e.g., the average loss rate or the average delay attributed by the
monitor to a domain, or a vector of several numbers e.g., average loss rate, average delay, and
number of neutrality violations.
Deﬁnition 3.1.2. A function uz : Sz ×A→Rn is called a rating function of domain z.
Deﬁnition 3.1.3. A collection
(
fG,u1, . . . ,uZ
)
is called a decision-making mechanism about G.
In addition to sz ∈ Sz , we denote with s−z ∈ (S \Sz) any statistical estimate that is not computed
exclusively based on z’s receipts for G , but may also be based on receipts emitted by other
domains and for other aggregates. E.g., if sz is the estimated mean loss rate of domain z w.r.t
G (which is computed exclusively based on z’s receipts), then s−z may be: the mean loss rate
of some other domain w.r.tG ; the mean loss rate of one of z’s inter-domain links w.r.tG ; z’s
mean loss rate w.r.t. some aggregate other thanG . As a result, vector s ∈ S can be written as
(sz , s−z), and the outcome selected by a decision function fG can be written as fG (sz , s−z).
Also, let s (resp. sz) denote a statistic when it is truthfully reported, and with s′ (resp. s′z) the
same statistic when it is manipulated through a bad-receipt attack.
3.2 Trust model and sub-problem
In the context of this chapter, the monitor is trusted, whereas the nodes may misbehave by
launching bad-receipt attacks. In such an attack, a node may: suppress a receipt, i.e., pretend
that it never received a packet that it actually did receive and dropped; emit a superﬂuous
receipt, i.e., pretend that it delivered a packet that it actually dropped; modify a receipt, i.e.,
pretend that it received a packet later, or delivered a packet earlier than it actually did. We
distinguish two kinds of bad-receipt attacks:
• Independent attacks, where the node acts independently from the nodes of other do-
mains, but possibly in cooperation with other nodes of the same domain.
• Collusion attacks, where two nodes that belong to neighbor domains may lie in collusion
to improve both of their domains’ position compared to other domains.
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Given this trust model, we want to design a decision-making mechanism
(
fG,u1, . . . ,uZ
)
with
the following properties:
1) The mechanism should be incentive-compatible under both independent and collusion
bad-receipt attacks: the decision and rating functions should be designed such that each
domain maximizes its rating by reporting truthfully.
Deﬁnition 3.2.1 (Incentive compatibility). We call a mechanism
(
fG,u1, . . . ,uZ
)
incentive com-
patible if for every domain z, every statistic s1 ∈ S1, . . . , sZ ∈ SZ and every s′z ∈ Sz, if we denote
α= fG (sz , s−z) and α′ = fG
(
s′z , s−z
)
, then uz (sz ,α)≥uz(s′z ,α′).
We want to ensure that every estimate sz is truthful, but not necessarily every piece of infor-
mation included in a receipt. This is because the monitor makes its decisions based on the
estimates, not on the individual receipts used to compute the estimates. Hence, a mechanism
that allows the domains to manipulate individual receipts without affecting the resulting
estimates is still incentive-compatible.
2) The rating metric should enable comparability, i.e., one should be able to compare and
at least partially order the ratings of a set of domains w.r.t. the same aggregate. Hence, we
consider one common codomain set for all rating functions uz that is either one-dimensional
and has a total order (in which case, in Def. 3.1.3, we have: n = 1 and Rn = R) or multi-
dimensional and equipped with a partial order.
To compare multi-dimensional ratings, we use a Kiviat diagram [39]. When comparing two
such ratings, it may happen that none of them is better than the other (e.g., one has a better
average loss rate, while the other has a better average delay). However, it is still useful to
determine whether a rating is non-dominated, i.e., the monitor did not compute any better
rating w.r.t. the given aggregate. When comparing several multi-dimensional ratings, the
non-dominated ones are the only ones of interest.
We use the following assumptions (Section §1.5):
First, for any given aggregate G and any given domain z on G’s path, each of z’s neighbors
knows the actual loss and delay performance of the inter-domain link between itself and z.
This is a reasonable assumption because any domain that is adjacent to an inter-domain link
can always directly debug that link and measure its loss and delay performance.
Second, the monitor employs standard statistical techniques to compute the accuracy of
each loss or delay estimate; to provide conﬁdence intervals, these techniques must assume
something about the nature of the loss/delay that is being estimated, and the typical assump-
tion is that loss/delay is i.i.d. (independent identically distributed) across all packets. This
is equivalent to the trafﬁc aggregates having always a small enough size that the packet loss
events and/or delays seem independent. We use this assumption to design our neutrality
detector (§3.4).
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3.3 Approach
In this section, we describe our approach. First, we explain our rationale (§3.3.1), which
is based on game-theoretic mechanism design [49]. Then, we provide intuition through
examples of ﬂawed mechanisms (§3.3.2).
3.3.1 Rationale
We formulate the problem using decision and rating functions because of their relevance
to game-theoretic mechanism design. Our rating functions are similar to the players’ utility
functions in game theory. Our decision functions are similar to social choice functions in game
theory: a social choice function aggregates the preferences of the different participants toward
a single joint decision; similarly, a decision function aggregates the information emitted by the
participating domains through their receipts toward a single decision about their performance.
We build on mechanism design with payments [49, 58, 34], but instead of payments we
use rating penalization. In our context, mechanism design with payments would enforce
payments for each domain that do not depend on the information provided by the domain
itself. Instead, we design the decision function such that: for every estimate sz ∈ Sz that
inﬂuences domain z’s rating and is based on z’s receipts, the monitor causes another estimate,
which is not based on z’s receipts, to also inﬂuence z’s rating. This is done in such a way that
misbehavior always decreases a domain’s rating.
This is why we deﬁned a rating function of domain z (Def. 3.1.3) to take as input not only Sz
(which is based on z’s receipts), but also A (the monitor’s decision about z). This is crucial in
our context. Suppose, for a moment, that a rating function of domain z took as input only Sz .
In that case, one domain’s strategy would never affect another domain’s rating. Hence, each
domain could choose its strategy by solving an independent optimization problem, and the
best strategy would always be to misbehave. By making the monitor’s decision an input to
the rating function, we make it possible to reason about how one domain’s strategy affects
another domain’s rating.
Our challenge is to ﬁnd rating penalties that make sense in our context and enable incentive
compatibility. We leverage two observations related to bad-receipt attacks: First, the only way
for a domain to lie about its mean loss rate or mean delay is to falsely attribute loss or delay
on one of its inter-domain links, which is shared responsibility with a neighbor. Second, a
domain that lies about its delay variance appears to violate neutrality. Before describing our
solution, we give intuition through two examples of ﬂawed mechanisms.
3.3.2 Examples
[1] Mean performance + collusion. Consider the following decision mechanism: The monitor
estimates the mean loss rate between each pair of consecutive nodes w.r.t. each aggregate.
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Then, as part of the decision function, the monitor determines each domain z’s performance
w.r.t. an aggregateG as the sum of the estimated mean loss rates of z’s intra-domain segment
and inter-domain links w.r.t. G . For instance, in Fig. 3.1, the monitor would determine z’s
performance w.r.t. G as the total estimated mean loss rate between nodes oz−1 and iz+1. When
all domains are honest, each domain’s rating is equal to its performance as determined by the
monitor (because this is the utility that the domain gains from the monitor’s decision). When
a domain misbehaves independently to harm a neighbor, it ends up with a signiﬁcantly worse
rating: In this mechanism, each domain determines the decision that the monitor makes
about its neighbors (e.g., the monitor’s decision about domain z depends on the receipts
emitted by nodes oz−1 and iz+1). If a domain lies in a way that causes the monitor to make a
worse decision about a neighbor, then it enters a dispute with that neighbor, which is bad for
the business of both involved domains. We capture this by assigning a rating of∞ to any pair
of neighboring domains that are in dispute.
With this mechanism, a domain that launches an independent bad-receipt attack does not
improve its rating; moreover, if the purpose of the attack is to harmaneighbor, themisbehaving
domain worsens its rating signiﬁcantly. For example, consider Fig. 3.1 and suppose that node
oz misbehaves, while all the other nodes are honest. In particular, every time z drops a packet
p from aggregateG , node oz pretends that it observed p by issuing a fake receipt for it. This
does not help domain z: First, the monitor concludes that packet p was dropped on the
inter-domain link between z and z+1; hence, the attack does not affect the decision that the
monitor makes about z, while it causes the monitor to make a worse decision about z +1.
Second, domain z+1 realizes that z’s exit node is misbehaving and enters a dispute with z,
causing both domains’ ratings to drop signiﬁcantly.
On the other hand, with this mechanism, a pair of neighboring domains have an incentive to
collude and improve both domains’ ratings. Consider again Fig 3.1 and suppose that all nodes
are honest except for nodes oz and iz+1 that misbehave in collusion in the following way:
Node oz manipulates its receipts to increase the estimated mean loss rate of z’s intra-domain
segment by Δz , while node iz+1 manipulates its receipts to also increase the estimated mean
loss rate of z+1’s intra-domain segment by Δz+1. Even though this increases the estimated
loss rate of each domain’s intra-domain segment, it decreases the estimated loss rate of their
inter-domain link by (Δz +Δz+1). As a result, not only do both domains increase their ratings,
but they also do it without affecting any other neighbor, hence without entering any dispute.
oz+1oz iz+1
z z+1
izoz-1
z-1
iz-1
Figure 3.1 – A part of an aggregate’s path.
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The problem is that summing up the estimated loss rates of overlapping segments creates the
opportunity for neighboring domains to increase their ratings by transferring utility between
them.
[2] Performance variance + independent attacks. Consider a decision mechanism where the
monitor estimates the mean delay and delay variance between each pair of consecutive nodes.
Then, as part of its decision process, the monitor determines domain z’s performance w.r.t.
aggregateG as a six-dimensional vector that contains the mean delay and the delay variance
of z’s intra-domain segment and inter-domain links w.r.t. G . The rating function is similar to
the one from the previous example: when a domain is not in dispute with any other domain,
its rating is equal to its performance (the six-dimensional vector) as computed by the monitor.
With this mechanism, a pair of neighboring domains cannot improve their ratings through
collusion. This is achieved simply by replacing the one-dimensional rating of the previous ex-
ample with a multi-dimensional one, which prevents neighboring domains from transferring
utility between them.
On the other hand, with this mechanism, each domain has an incentive to launch an inde-
pendent bad-receipt attack and claim lower delay variance for its intra-domain segment. For
example, consider Fig. 3.1 and suppose that node oz misbehaves, while all the other nodes are
honest. Let D be the true delay of z’s intra-domain segment w.r.t. G ; let X be the true delay of
the inter-domain link between oz and iz+1 w.r.t. G ; and let D ′ and X ′ be the corresponding
estimated delays (which are affected by oz ’s misbehavior). Since all the nodes except for oz
are honest, D+X =D ′ +X ′. Node oz changes the timestamps of its receipts such that: it does
not affect any of the estimated mean delays, while var (D ′)< var (D), var (X ′)< var (X ) and
var (D+X )= var (D ′ +X ′). This causes the monitor to make better decisions for both z and
z+1, which means that z+1 has no incentive to enter a dispute with z, and both domains
improve their ratings.
The problem is that, unlike changes in mean performance, changes in performance variance
are not always externalizable. As a result, a domain that lies about the performance variance
of an intra-domain segment may end up increasing both its own and a neighbor’s rating (as in
the example above).
3.4 Analysis and Solution
In this section, we present our solution. First, we state necessary and sufﬁcient conditions
that make a decision mechanism incentive-compatible (§3.4.1). Then, we describe two
fundamental trade-offs involved in bad-receipt attacks (§3.4.2, §3.4.3). Finally, we specify a
mechanism that leverages these trade-offs to impose penalties that meet the conditions for
incentive-compatibility (§3.4.4).
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3.4.1 Rating penalties
As stated in §3.3.1, we capture the fact that domain ratings depend on the monitor’s decisions
by making each monitor decision an input to a rating function. To make this dependence
explicit, we update our initial notation for the rating functions: instead of the generic notation
uz
(
sz , fG (sz , s−z)
)
, where fG (sz , s−z) is the monitor’s decision, we will use uz (sz ,πz), where
πz ∈ S is the penalty that the monitor’s decision inﬂicts on z’s rating.
The following theorem adapts mechanism design with payments to mechanism design with
rating penalization:
Theorem 3.4.1 (Proper penalization). A mechanism
(
fG,u1, . . . ,uZ
)
is incentive-compatible iff:
i. The rating function of each domain z includes a penalty that does not depend on sz, but
on the decision made by the mechanism fG (sz , s−z). I.e. for every s−z , there exist penalties
πα ∈ S, for every α ∈A, such that for all sz with fG (sz , s−z)=α, we have that the rating of z
is uz (sz ,πα).
ii. The mechanism optimizes for each domain z when it tells the truth. I.e. for every domain z,
we have fG(sz , s−z) ∈ ar gmaxα(u(sz ,πα)), where the maximization is over all alternative
decisions in the range of fG(·, s−z).
Proof. See section §3.5.
Theorem3.4.1 formalizes the simple intuition already discussed in Section 3.3.1: each domain’s
penalty πz should not depend exclusively on the estimates sz ∈ Sz computed from z’s receipts
(which z could manipulate), but also on other estimates s−z ∈ (S \Sz).
3.4.2 Disputes and externalization
Certain statistics have the “externalization” property: if a domain z launches an independent
bad-receipt attack to exaggerate its intra-domain performance w.r.t. such a statistic, then at
least one of its inter-domain links will appear worse w.r.t. the same statistic. Mean loss rate is
such a statistic, and its externalization was illustrated in Example [I] in Section §3.3.2.
We can leverage externalization to provide a rating with proper penalization (in the sense of
Thm 3.4.1): If the monitor determines, as part of a domain z’s performance w.r.t. aggregate
G , not only z’s intra-domain performance, but also that of its inter-domain links, then a
misbehaving domain’s rating is penalized in two ways:
• Weak penalization: A bad-receipt attack essentially shifts the blame for some loss or
delay from an intra-domain segment to at least one inter-domain link. For instance, if
domain z uses bad receipts to reduce its perceived intra-domain mean loss rate w.r.t.G
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by Δ, it will cause the perceived aggregate mean loss rate of its inter-domain links w.r.t.
G to increase by Δ.
Weak penalization makes a misbehaving domain internalize the externality caused by
the attack, which means that the domain has no incentive to launch the attack.
• Strong penalization: By shifting the blame for loss/delay to an inter-domain link, a
domain essentially shifts part of the blame to the neighbor connected through that link
(because an inter-domain link is shared responsibility between two domains). Moreover,
the falsely blamed neighbor detects the attack and identiﬁes the misbehaving domain
(because of the assumption we have made in Section 3.2 that a domain knows the true
performance of its inter-domain links). Hence, a domain that launches a bad-receipt
attack independently from the neighbor(s) affected by the attack enters a dispute with
them. This is strong penalization in the sense that such a dispute with a neighbor has a
signiﬁcant negative impact on a domain’s business.
Strong penalization provides an incentive to domains to not launch bad-receipt attacks.
Let xz ∈ (S \Sz) denote the estimate of the same type as sz that the monitor computes for
the inter-domain link that follows domain z on a given aggregate’s path. E.g., if sz is domain
z’s intra-domain mean loss rate w.r.t. an aggregate G , then xz is the mean loss rate of the
inter-domain link between z and z+1. Similarly, xz−1 ∈ (S \Sz−1) denotes the estimate of the
same type as sz−1 (and sz) that the monitor computes for the inter-domain link that follows
domain z−1.
Deﬁnition 3.4.1. We say that an estimate sz is “externalizable” when the following holds: if
s′z ≶ sz , then x ′z ≷ xz or x ′z−1≷ xz−1.
Lemma 3.4.2. Mean estimates are externalizable; variances and percentiles are not.
Proof. The proof is in §3.5, but a short version is the following: the expectation of the aggre-
gated loss/delay distribution of all three segments that a domain is responsible for (intra- and
inter-domain) is a linear operator over the estimates of these segments, whereas variance and
percentiles are not.
Lemma 3.4.3 (Externalization is sufﬁcient under independent attacks). There exists a deci-
sion mechanism that is based on externalizable statistics and is incentive-compatible under
independent bad-receipt attacks.
Proof. See section §3.5.
Lemma 3.4.4 (Multi-dimensional rating with partial order is sufﬁcient under collusion). There
exists a decision mechanism that is based on externalizable statistics, uses multi-dimensional
rating with a partial order, and is incentive-compatible under colluding bad-receipt attacks.
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Proof. See section §3.5.
The last lemma is related to Example [2] in Section 3.3.2, where two misbehaving domains
exploited one-dimensional rating and colluded to improve their ratings. The lemma says
that a multi-dimensional rating prevents this type of collusion. The gist of the proof is that
having separate rating values for different (intra-domain and inter-domain) segments prevents
neighbors from “exchanging” utility.
To summarize: we can design a decision mechanism, where the monitor estimates externaliz-
able statistics (mean loss rate and mean delay) and does so separately about each intra- and
inter-domain segment; such that each participating domain has an incentive to emit truthful
receipts.
3.4.3 Discrimination and internalization
Unfortunately, delay variance is not externalizable, yet it does need to be part of our decision
mechanism. First, network users care about it: for a ﬂow packet rate of hundreds of packets
per second or less, collecting the sample size necessary to achieve reasonable accuracy takes
tens of minutes or more; mean delay over such a long period of time does not provide enough
information on its own to assess network performance. Second, knowing the delay variance
is necessary for accurately estimating mean delay: recall that we express accuracy through
γ-conﬁdence intervals, which are functions of variance; hence, without knowing the delay
variance, the monitor could not compute the accuracy of its mean-delay estimates. In sum-
mary, we face the following challenge: mean delays are externalizable, so we could incentivize
the domains to report them truthfully; however, to assess the accuracy of each mean-delay
estimate, we need to know delay variance, which is not externalizable, hence domains could
lie about it.
Our solution relies on the relationship between variance and neutrality. If a network seg-
ment does not experience performance variance and is neutral, then it has the same mean
performance w.r.t. all ﬂows that traverse it. Conversely, a network segment’s performance
variance and degree of discrimination determine how different its mean performance is w.r.t.
the different ﬂows that traverse it. As we will see, because of this relationship, if a domain
manipulates its receipts to report lower than its actual performance variance, this is equivalent
to reporting more than its actual discrimination, and vice versa. Hence, we can design an
incentive-compatible decision mechanism by incorporating both variance and discrimination
in the decision and rating functions.
Discrimination detection
A straightforward way to detect whether domain z discriminates aggregateG is to compare z’s
performance w.r.t. two aggregates: G and the aggregate that consists of all trafﬁc that enters
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and exits z at the same nodes asG ; we denote the latter by Y . If z’s mean loss rates or mean
delays w.r.t. G and Y are signiﬁcantly different, then z discriminates either against or in favor
ofG .
Our systemdoes not enable this kind of detection, because it exposes only the domains’ sample
mean performance (based on their receipts), which can differ from the true performance due
to sampling error. Comparing the sample means without taking into account their accuracy
does not make sense.
Let μY (μG) denote domain z’s true performance mean w.r.t. aggregate Y (G), and let σ2Y
(σ2G) denote z’s true variance. Also, let μˆY (μˆG) denote z’s sample performance mean w.r.t.
aggregate Y (G), and let σˆ2Y (σˆ
2
G) denote z’s sample variance. The sample means and variances
are computed based on z’s receipts (i.e. a random sample of the relevant trafﬁc aggregate).
We can approximate μY and σ2Y with μˆY and σˆ
2
Y . This approximation is acceptable because Y
consists of all the ﬂows that traverse the corresponding path segment, hence typically has a
signiﬁcantly bigger sample size than the rest of the aggregates.
According to the central limit theorem (CLT), μˆG is distributed around μG according to the
normal distribution with variance σ2G/NG , where NG is G’s sample size1. We denote by fN the
density function of the normal distribution N
(
μˆY ,
σˆ2Y
NG
)
, and by F−1
N
its inverse cumulative
distribution function.
Deﬁnition 3.4.2 (Neutrality likelihood). We deﬁne the likelihood LG that z is neutral w.r.t. G as
LG ≡ fN (μˆG).
LG is simply the likelihood that μG =μY , where μY is approximated by μˆY .
Deﬁnition 3.4.3 (Discrimination detector). We determine, with conﬁdence level γ, whether
domain z discriminates w.r.t. aggregate G based on the following function:
detectG(μˆG, μˆY , σˆ
2
Y ,γ,NG )=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
G was treated worse , if μˆG > F−1N
(
1− 1−γ2
)
G was treated better , if μˆG < F−1N
(
1−γ
2
)
G was treated neutrally , otherwise
(3.1)
Our detector (Def. 3.4.3 and Fig. 3.2) simply determines whether domain z’s sample mean
performance w.r.t. aggregateG is “far away” from z’s sample mean performance w.r.t. aggre-
gate Y (the rest of the trafﬁc), with conﬁdence level γ. Conversely, one can view 1−γ as the
signiﬁcance level of the null hypothesis thatG is not neutrally treated.
1The use of CLT is subject to our second assumption of Section §3.2: G has a small enough size that the packet
loss events and/or delays seem independent; hence, a random sample ofG always yields a set of i.i.d. loss/delay
values. If the size ofG is larger so that the sample loss/delay values can be assumed to be weakly dependent, then
the CLT for dependent random variables [37] must be used instead.
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Figure 3.2 – Trafﬁc-discrimination detection.
Internalization of misbehavior:
We can leverage the relationship between variance and discrimination to provide a rating with
proper penalization (in the sense of Thm 3.4.1): Suppose the monitor includes in its decision
about domain z and aggregateG , not only z’s mean performance w.r.t. G , but also: z’s sample
mean performance and sample variance w.r.t. Y and z’s likelihood of discrimination w.r.t. G .
Then, a misbehaving domain’s rating is penalized in two ways:
• Weak penalization: Suppose domain z lies about its variance, i.e., manipulates its
receipts to artiﬁcially decrease its sample variance w.r.t. Y ; this automatically increases
the likelihood that z discriminatesw.r.t. G . Conversely, suppose z lies about its neutrality,
i.e., manipulates its receipts to artiﬁcially decrease the likelihood that it discriminates
w.r.t. G ; this automatically increases z’s sample variance w.r.t. G .
By including both metrics (sample variance w.r.t. Y and likelihood of discrimination
w.r.t. G), we prevent a domain from improving its rating by lying about either metric,
which means that the domain has no incentive to do so.
• Strong penalization: By deﬁnition of our discrimination detector, when domain z is
honest, it is perceived as discriminating w.r.t. a fractionφz of its aggregates that is always
equal to γ. Conversely, when z lies about its variance, φz 
= γ. Hence, one can tell that z
is lying about its variance simply by comparing φz and γ. This is strong penalization in
the sense that being exposed as lying about variance, especially to hide discrimination,
can have a signiﬁcant impact on a domain’s business.
We call the trade-off between variance and discrimination an “internalization,” because lying
about either one directly affects the lying domain’s rating through the other—as opposed to
an “externalization,” where lying ﬁrst affects another domain’s rating, then indirectly the lying
domain’s rating through the resulting dispute.
To summarize, we can design a decision mechanism, where the monitor estimates not only
externalizable statistics, but also variances; such that each participating domain has an
incentive to emit truthful receipts.
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3.4.4 The mechanism
In Def. 3.4.4, we state our decision-making mechanism
(
fG,u1, . . . ,uZ
)
that uses the external-
ization and internalization trade-offs to provide incentive-compatibility:
Deﬁnition 3.4.4 (Mechanism). Given an aggregate G, the monitor attributes a performance
to each domain z that observed G, by using all the emitted receipts and the following decision
function:
fG(S)=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
z’s intra-domain average performance is μˆ{0}G
z’s inter-domain average performance is
(
μˆ{+1}G , μˆ
{−1}
G
)
σ{0}G = σˆ{0}Y
(3.2)
where the superscripts denote z’s intra- and inter-domain segment on G’s path; i.e.:
• μˆ{0}G is the sample mean loss (resp. delay) w.r.t. G inside z,
• μˆ{+1}G is the sample mean loss (resp. delay) w.r.t. G of the inter-domain link after z,
• μˆ{−1}G is the sample mean loss (resp. delay) w.r.t. G of the inter-domain link before z,
• μˆ{0}Y is the sample mean loss (resp. delay) w.r.t. Y inside z,
• σˆ{0}Y is the standard deviation of the loss rate (resp. delay) w.r.t. Y inside z.
Given the monitor’s decisions about all domains and aggregates, z’s rating2 becomes:
uz =
{
(∞,∞,∞,∞,∞,−∞) , if z is in dispute or φz 
= γ (strong penalization)(
μˆ{0}G , μˆ
{+1}
G , μˆ
{−1}
G , μˆ
{0}
Y , σˆ
{0}
Y ,L
{0}
G
)
,otherwise (weak penalization)
(3.3)
The mechanism of Def. 3.4.4 is incentive-compatible, because it fulﬁlls the two necessary
conditions of Thm. 3.4.1: The rating function of each domain z includes penalties πz =(
μˆ{+1}G , μˆ
{−1}
G , μˆ
{0}
Y , σˆ
{0}
Y ,L
{0}
G
)
that do not depend on z’s receipts forG , but on the monitor’s way
of deciding, i.e. the attribution of the average performance of the inter-domain links, and the
use of the detection method described in §3.4.3 and the fact that the monitor approximates
the variance of z’s performance about G with the variance of the performance about the
entire trafﬁc, i.e., σ2G = σˆ2Y . Note that μˆ{+1}G , μˆ{−1}G , μˆ{0}Y , σˆ{0}Y and L{0}G are just special types of s−z
that do not depend only on z’s receipts aboutG , as opposed to μˆ{0}G . Also, because of strong
penalization, the mechanism maximizes each domain’s rating when the domain tells the truth
about the input statistics.
2For the strong penalization of a misbehaving domain, each vector element of its multi-dimensional rating
is selected to be either ∞ or −∞ according to its nature: e.g., if the vector element denotes a loss rate or delay
estimate, then we use ∞, because it is worse than any real value; else, if the vector element denotes the neutrality
likelihood, then we use −∞, because it is worse than any likelihood value.
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Our mechanism addresses our goal G4: it enables domain-performance comparison and
trafﬁc-discrimination detection based on truthful statistics. For neutrality checks, the monitor
uses the detector inDef. 3.4.3, while for performance comparison of any twodomains z1,z2 ∈ Z
that are not in dispute and do not violate neutrality (i.e. φz = γ), it uses a partial order and
Kiviat diagrams [39] to compare the rating vectors uz1 and uz2 .
3.5 Proofs
Theorem 3.4.1
Proof. [“if” part:] Let α= fG (sz , s−z), α′ = fG
(
s′z , s−z
)
, and consider the corresponding penal-
ties: πα and π′α. The rating of z when telling the truth about sz is therefore uz (sz ,πα),
while when misbehaving it is uz
(
s′z ,π′α
)
. Then, since the mechanism optimizes for z, i.e.
α= fG (sz , s−z) ∈ ar gmaxα(u(sz ,πα)), we have that uz (sz ,πα)≥uz
(
s′z ,π′α
)
.
The “only if” part is proved through contradiction:
[“only if” part – item (i):] Assume that for some sz and s′z , we have fG (sz , s−z)= fG
(
s′z , s−z
)=
α, but uz (sz ,πα) ≤ uz
(
s′z ,πα
)
, then z could increase its rating by declaring s′z instead of sz
(untruthful reporting).
[“only if” part – item (ii):] Assume that fG(sz , s−z) ∉ ar gmaxα(u(sz ,πα)) and let some other
decision α′ maximize z’s rating in the range of fG(·, s−z): i.e. α′ ∈ ar gmaxα(u(sz ,πα)). Thus,
for some s′z , α′ = fG
(
s′z , s−z
)
, which means that z could increase its rating by declaring s′z
instead of sz (untruthful reporting).
Lemma 3.4.3
Proof. Lemma is proved if we ﬁnd a rating function with the conditions of Thm. 3.4.1. A
mechanism (fG,uz), where the monitor computes each domain’s performance as a vector
containing the mean (loss rate or and/or delay) performance in its intra- and inter-domain
segments, considers all three segments for which z is responsible by construction. Denote
with sz the statistic of interest. The rating of each domain can be the following vector: uz =
(s′z ,x ′z ,x ′z−1). The rating includes statistics that do not depend only on z’s receipts: x
′
z ,x
′
z−1 ∈
S \Sz . Also, without loss of generality suppose that z reports s′z < sz , which implies that at
least one of the two holds, x ′z > xz or x ′z−1 > xz−1. Then, (sz ,xz ,xz−1) is not dominated by
(s′z ,x ′z ,x ′z−1), which means that z does not increase its rating by lying. Moreover, z is exposed
to at least one neighbor, which results in strong penalization. In this case, the monitor can
assign to z a very bad rating, e.g. uz = (∞,∞,∞), which makes the mechanism optimize for z
only when z reports truthfully, because (sz ,xz ,xz−1)< (∞,∞,∞).
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Lemma 3.4.2
Proof. For the proof of this lemma, we will abuse notation and let sz , xz and xz−1 denote not
the statistics of the intra-domain and inter-domain segments, but the loss/delay distributions
of the corresponding segments:
[Mean:] In Fig. 3.1, let domain z lie about the mean loss/delay of its internal network by
manipulating the receipts of its exit node, i.e. it reports E
[
s′z
] 
= E [sz ]; while the entry node of
z+1 reports truthfully3. Then, since E [sz +xz ]= E
[
s′z +x ′z
]⇔ E [sz ]+E [xz ]= E[s′z]+E[x ′z], we
have: E
[
s′z
]< E [sz ]⇒ E[x ′z]> E [xz ]. Similarly, E[s′z]> E [sz ]⇒ E[x ′z]< E [xz ].
[Variance:] As previously, let z manipulate the loss/delay variance through the receipts of its
exit node, i.e. it reports var
[
s′z
] 
= var [sz ], while the entry node of z+1 reports truthfully. Then,
since var [sz +xz ] = var
[
s′z +x ′z
]⇔ var [sz ]+ var [xz ]+2cov [sz ,xz ] = var [s′z]+ var [x ′z]+
2cov
[
s′z ,x ′z
]
, externality is not always possible: for a given cov [sz ,xz ], that is unknown to
the monitor, z can manipulate cov
[
s′z ,x ′z
]
, so that var
[
s′z
]< var [sz ], and at the same time
var
[
x ′z
]< var [xz ].
[Percentiles:] A domain can report a lower percentile, by only decreasing its intra-domain
variance and without changing the reported intra-domain mean. Since variance is not exter-
nalizable, percentiles are not either.
Lemma 3.4.4
Proof. Let sz be the mean intra-domain loss/delay estimate and sz ,xz ,xz−1 be the mean
inter-domain loss/delay estimates. Consider a mechanism where the monitor computes
each domain’s performance as a vector containing the mean (loss rate or delay) performance
in its intra- and inter-domain segments; hence by construction takes into account all three
segments for which z is responsible. Let z and z + 1 collude and report s′z = sz +Δz and
s′z+1 = sz+1+Δz+1, so that x ′z = xz −Δz −Δz+1, where Δz ,Δz+1 ≥ 0. Then, because of the partial
order, z’s rating uz(s′z ,x ′z ,x ′z−1)=uz(sz +Δz ,xz −Δz −Δz+1,x ′z−1) does not dominate the rating
that it would have if it reported truthfully, i.e. uz(sz ,xz −Δz+1,x ′z−1).
3This is without loss of generality, because manipulating the receipts of z’s entry node is just the dual problem
towards its other neighbor z−1.
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In this chapter, we describe how we achieve goal G3: the monitor’s estimation should be
unbiasable. When a domain’s performance is estimated based on how it treats a small sample
of forwarded packets, the domain has an incentive to bias the sample—treat the sampled
packets better than the rest—resulting in arbitrarily inaccurate estimation of its performance.
Therefore, we study “prioritization attacks”, where the domains emit truthful receipts, yet
prioritize sampled packets to claim lower loss or delay. In the face of such attacks, basic
consistent sampling (§2.1) is not enough: the nodes can easily determine whether a packet
is sampled upon its arrival and treat it accordingly. Instead, we propose retro-active packet
sampling, where the sampling function is keyed on subsequent trafﬁc, making the samples
unpredictable.
We ﬁrst present our trust model (§4.1). Then, we describe our algorithm (§4.2) and sketch
one possible hardware implementation (§4.3). Finally, we analyze the attack resistance (§4.4),
accuracy (§4.5), and resource requirements (§4.6) of our algorithm and conﬁrm them with an
experimental evaluation (§4.7).
4.1 Trust model and sub-problem
In the context of this chapter, the monitor is trusted, while a node (and the domain that owns
the node) may launch a “prioritization attack”: it emits truthful receipts, but treat some or
all of the sampled packets preferentially (e.g., by assigning them to higher-priority queues
or routing them through a better intra-domain path), thereby introduce sampling bias to
exaggerate the domain’s performance.
Given this trust model, we want to design a sampling algorithm that: (a) yields an unbiased,
representative sample based on which the monitor can compute estimates with a desired
(γ,)-accuracy in a desired time interval T , while (b) it does not require an increase in the
node’s data-to-control-path bandwidth or data-path memory by more than a few percentage
points.
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Symbols
p A packet
d A disclosure packet
F A ﬂow
Workload characteristics
r Packet arrival rate of a ﬂow at a node
R Total packet arrival rate at a node
Algorithm parameters
β The size of the receipt buffer
κ The duration of the quiet period
δr
Disclosure rate: prob. that a packet from a ﬂow
with packet rate r is picked as a disclosure packet
σ Selection rate: prob. that a non-excluded packet is sampled
Table 4.1 – Parameters and symbols
We restate the following assumption (§1.5):
The packet arrivals of each ﬂow form a stationary and ergodic process with a high enough rate
(e.g. at the order of OC-12 or higher) that ergodic convergence is achieved in less than 100msec.
The limitation resulting from this assumption is that we cannot reason about aggregates that
consist of relatively few packets/sec, e.g., an aggregate that consists of a typical TCP ﬂow.
We think that this is acceptable given our motivation to enable the comparison of domain
performance and the veriﬁcation of neutrality regulations, which typically apply to relatively
large aggregates. This assumption is used for the proofs of Lemmas 4.4.1 and 4.5.1.
4.2 Solution
We now describe our algorithm, which we call “retroactive sampling”: ﬁrst the parts that are
adapted from prior work (§4.2.1), then the novel parts (§4.2.3) and the rationale behind them
(§4.2.4).
Table 4.1 states all the relevant symbols.
4.2.1 Basic Delayed Disclosure
The algorithm (Alg.2) takes as input the sequence of packets arriving at a node and outputs a
sequence of receipts to be exported to the monitor. Each node maintains a circular “receipt
buffer” of size β, where it adds a receipt for every new packet (lines 1,2). Moreover, from each
observed ﬂow F , the node picks some packets that act as “disclosure packets”; these special
packets determine the sampling fate of the previously observed packets from F . For example,
in Fig. 4.1, disclosure packet d1 determines that, among previously observed packets p0 . . .p9,
only p1 and p4 will be sampled.
26
4.2. Solution
Algorithm 2 RetroActiveSampling (p)
pˆ non-mutable content of packet p
Receipt() constructs a receipt
PacketRate() computes packet rate
DiscHash() hash function
DiscRange() subset of DiscHash’s range
Hash() hash function
Range subset of Hash’s range
1: rec′ ←Receipt(p,currentTime)
2: Add rec′ to receipt buffer.
3: r ← PacketRate(rec′.ﬂowID)
4: if DiscHash
(
pˆ
) ∈DiscRange(r ) then
5: Emit receipt rec′.
6: if LateDisclosure(ﬂowID) then
7: Emit warning.
8: end if
9: for all receipts rec in receipt buffer with
10: rec.ﬂowID= rec′.ﬂowID do
11: Remove rec from receipt buffer.
12: if
(
currentTime− rec.timestamp)≤ κ then
13: continue
14: end if
15: if Hash
(
rec.digest,rec′.digest
) ∈Range then
16: Emit receipt rec.
17: end if
18: end for
19: end if
More speciﬁcally: When a new packet d arrives, the node picks d as a disclosure packet with
some probability, by applying a hash function with strong randomization properties on d’s
non-mutable content (line 4). If d is picked as a disclosure packet, the node samples d (line 5),
removes from the receipt buffer all receipts with the same ﬂowID as d (lines 9–11), and picks
some of them for sampling (lines 15, 16).
One key point is that, whether a packet p is sampled or not depends on the next disclosure
packet d from the same ﬂow as p that arrives at the node; we say that “disclosure for p happens”
when d arrives at the node, and that d is “p’s disclosure packet.”
Another key point is that disclosure packets are normal packets that happen to be picked
by the nodes to play a particular role in the sampling algorithm; disclosure packets are not
explicitly labeled by anyone, nor explicitly introduced into the trafﬁc stream by the monitor,
the nodes, or the trafﬁc sources. If two nodes observe the same ﬂow, they pick the same
packets as disclosure packets (modulo loss), by virtue of using the same function on line 4.
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4.2.2 Late Disclosure
We say that “packet p suffers late disclosure” at a node, when p’s disclosure packet arrives at
the node after p’s receipt has been overwritten in the circular receipt buffer (in which case
lines 9 to 18 are never executed for p). For example, suppose that, in Fig. 4.1, by the time
disclosure packet d1 arrives at the node, packet p1’s receipt has been overwritten; in this case,
p1 suffers late disclosure.
When late disclosure occurs at a node, the node warns the monitor: When a node picks packet
d1 from ﬂow F as a disclosure packet, it checks whether the receipt for the previous disclosure
packet, d0, from F is still in the buffer (line 6); if yes, it is certain that none of F ’s packets that
arrived at the node between d0 and d1 suffered late disclosure. if no, the node emits a “late
disclosure” warning (line 7), which references the earliest of F ’s packets whose receipt is still
in the buffer. Back to our last example: When d1 arrives at the node, the node detects that d0’s
receipt is not in the buffer, and that the earliest of F ’s packets whose receipt is still in the buffer
is p2. Hence, the node emits a late-disclosure warning that references p2, which indicates that
F ’s packets that arrived at the node between d0 and p2 may have suffered late disclosure.
4.2.3 Quiet Periods and Adaptive Disclosure
We want disclosure to happen too late to be useful to a misbehaving node/domain; the
challenge lies in achieving this goal for the millions of ﬂows observed by each node, without
violating the simplicity of basic delayed disclosure.
First, we impose a “quiet period” of duration κ before each disclosure packet, during which no
packets from the same ﬂow can be sampled. More speciﬁcally, if p’s disclosure packet arrives
less than κ time units after p, the node explicitly excludes p from sampling (lines 12,13). For
example, in Fig. 4.1, the node excludes packets p6 to p9 from sampling, because they arrive
during the quiet period that precedes their disclosure packet d1.
Second, we adapt the disclosure process to each ﬂow’s packet rate: When a new packet p
arrives, the node roughly estimates F ’s packet rate r (line 3) and picks p as a disclosure packet
with a probability δr that depends on r . The nodes track ﬂow packet rates without maintaining
explicit per-ﬂow state. A separate lookup table that maintains per-ﬂow packet rates is out
of the question, as it would introduce precisely the kind of expensive state we have been
trying to avoid with our design. In the Appendix, Section 4.3, we describe a hardware-friendly
implementation that does not keep explicit per-ﬂow state.
When disclosure for packet p happens neither early nor late, the node picks p for sampling
with a ﬁxed probability σ, by applying a hash function with strong randomization properties
on p’s and its disclosure packet’s non-mutable contents (lines 15, 16). For example, in Fig. 4.1,
after processing disclosure packet d1, the node samples previously observed packets p1 and
p4.
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quiet period
?? p9p8p7p6p5p4p3p2p1p0 ??
Figure 4.1 – Delayed disclosure and exclusion.
4.2.4 Rationale
Our algorithm is the result of combining delayed disclosure with consistent sampling: The
former requires that each packet p’s sampling fate be determined by a subsequent disclosure
packet; the latter requires that all nodes that observe pmake the same sampling decision about
it. Combining the two, p and its disclosure packet should ideally traverse the same nodes, i.e.,
the same inter-domain path. In the current Internet architecture, there is no way to guarantee
this; the best indication a node has that two arriving packets follow the same inter-domain
path is that they share the same ﬂow—the same source and destination IP preﬁx—which is
why nodes pick p’s disclosure packet from the same ﬂow.
Given that our algorithm’s decisions are affected by local trafﬁc, the nodes may, occasionally,
sample inconsistently (e.g., due to late disclosure); when this happens, the monitor identiﬁes
and discards the inconsistent samples. So, inconsistent sampling affects efﬁciency (it causes
the monitor to collect fewer useful samples), but not correctness (it does not cause the monitor
to make incorrect estimates).
Quiet periods make prioritization attacks more expensive by ensuring that the decision to
sample a packet p is disclosed within time κ from p’s observation only for a limited number
of packets that is conﬁgurable through the arrival probability of the disclosure packets or
differentially the disclosure rate δ. As we will see, by tuning κ and δ, we can control how much
a misbehaving domain worsens its perceived delay performance.
The adaptation of the disclosure process to each ﬂow’s packet rate regulates early and late
disclosure and ensures that each node produces enough receipts from each ﬂow to enable
accurate statistics. Both early and late disclosure exclude packets from sampling; hence, if we
want a node to sample packets from a ﬂow F at some minimum rate, we have to ensure that
enough packets from F escape early and late disclosure. The probability of early disclosure
depends on the interplay between F ’s packet rate r , the disclosure rate δ, and the quiet-period
duration κ; this interplay determines how many of F ’s packets fall into a quiet period. The
probability of late disclosure depends on the interplay between r , δ, the rest of the trafﬁc
arriving at the node, and the size of the receipt buffer β; this interplay determines how quickly
the receipt buffer ﬁlls up and how many of F ’s receipts are overwritten prematurely. So, to
keep the probabilities of early and late disclosure at a desired value, we have to quantify the
above interactions and continuously adapt the disclosure process to F ’s packet rate—this is
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why nodes track ﬂow packet rates and why δ is a function of r .
4.3 Sketch of a Hardware Design
Our proposed hardware implementation consists of two parallel threads: a “producer” thread
that processes incoming packets, computes receipts, and adds them to the local state; and a
“consumer” thread that removes receipts from the local state and determines whether to emit
or discard each receipt. The local state, however, is organized differently: there is a receipt
buffer for “normal” packets, stored in SRAM and accessible only as a queue; and a receipt
buffer for disclosure packets, stored in content-addressable memory (CAM) that supportsO(1)
parallel lookups on the ﬂowID ﬁeld.
Organizing state in separate receipt buffers for normal and disclosure packets (as opposed to a
common receipt buffer) does not introduce any extra or any per-ﬂow state; we keep exactly as
many receipts for normal and disclosure packets as Alg. 2, we just store them in two different
kinds of memory, because receipts for disclosure packets need to be looked up by ﬂowID
(hence require CAM), whereas receipts for normal packets, which constitute the vast majority,
do not (hence can be stored in cheaper SRAM).
The consumer thread performs the actual sampling: It iterates over the receipt buffer for
normal packets, removes receipts, and performs the following operations for each receipt
rec that corresponds to a normal packet p: (a) It retrieves the set of all receipts R in the
disclosure buffer with the same ﬂowID as p. (b) It ﬁnds inR the receipt rec′ that corresponds
to p’s disclosure packet: it is the one with the earliest timestamp that satisﬁes rec′.timestamp
> rec.timestamp. It increments rec′.packetCtr. It determines whether to exclude or select p
according to lines 10 and 12 of Alg. 2. (c) It checks whether disclosure may have occurred late
for p, i.e., if there is no receipt inR with timestamp< rec.timestamp. If so, it emits a warning.
The producer thread creates the local state: It processes each incoming packet p, computes a
receipt rec′ for it, extracts the ﬂowID, retrieves F ’s packet rate, checks whether to pick p as a
disclosure packet according to line 4 of Alg. 2, and adds rec′ to the appropriate receipt buffer.
Moreover, the producer thread tracks ﬂow packet rates based on information that is piggy-
backed by the consumer thread on the disclosure receipts. We previously said that receipts
consist of three ﬁelds (§2.1); receipts for disclosure packets have two additional ﬁelds for
packet-rate tracking, packetRate and packetCtr. Consider a ﬂow F and suppose the ﬁrst
disclosure packet d1 arrives at time t1; when the second disclosure packet d2 arrives at time
t2, the producer thread retrieves d1’s receipt rec, estimates F ’s packet rate (as rec.packetCtr
divided by t2− t1), and stores the estimate in d2’s receipt (in the packetRate ﬁeld); when the
third disclosure packet d3 arrives, the node repeats the process, computes a new packet-rate
estimate, and stores it in d3’s receipt; and so on. The node may compute a brand new estimate
every time a disclosure packet arrives, or it may update the previous estimate, akin to keeping
a moving-average ﬁlter [38]; we choose the latter, because it ensures a smooth variation of
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estimate without risking sharp increases in rare cases where disclosure packets arrive very
close to each other.
We do not need perfect packet-rate tracking: Suppose a ﬂow’s real packet rate is r , while the
estimated one is rˆ . If r and rˆ are in the same zone (map to the same disclosure rate), the
disclosure process works as intended; if they map to different disclosure rates, then, of course,
it is possible that the chosen disclosure rate is too high or too low for the real packet rate, and
we miss the desired accuracy until the estimate catches up with the real value. The fewer
disclosure-rate values we use, the less likely we are to hit this scenario, and this is why we
designed our disclosure process to operate with smallest number of disclosure-rate values.
With this design, each node performs per packet: two hash computations, a couple of times-
tamp comparisons, a read and a write access to SRAM, and a parallel lookup and an update in
the CAM.
4.4 Misbehavior Analysis
In this section, we analyze our algorithm’s behavior in the face of prioritization attacks: we
present our attack model (§4.4.1), then prove that it is possible to parametrize our algorithm
such that any prioritization attack is ineffective (§4.4.2).
4.4.1 Attack Model
In a prioritization attack, the misbehaving node runs the algorithm, but also buffers each
arriving packet p for a maximum “buffering period” t ≥ 0 before forwarding it, with the hope
that it will learn some information about p’s sampling fate. The attack is successful when
the beneﬁt gained from learning this information outweighs the cost of buffering—hence
delaying—packets.
More concretely, consider domain x in Fig. 4.2 with an entry node i and an exit node o, and
two routes between i and o: a “good” route with mean loss and delay {lg ,dg }, and a “bad” route
with mean loss and delay {lb ≥ lg ,db ≥ dg }. We consider one ﬂow F that enters x at node i with
packet rate r and exits at node o. Of all the packets arriving at i , the maximum fraction that
can be forwarded over the good route is g. Node i forwards a fraction g ∈ [0,1) of F ’s packets
over the good route and the rest over the bad route. Upon receiving a packet p, node i runs
Alg. 2, then Alg. 3: It buffers p for a maximum period t ≥ 0 (line 1). If disclosure occurs while
p is buffered (lines 2,3), and it occurs early or determines that p will not be sampled (line 4),
then i forwards p over the bad route (line 5), unless it has already exhausted the bad route’s
capacity (line 6). If disclosure occurs while p is buffered, does not occur early, and determines
that p will be sampled (line 7), then i forwards p over the good route (line 8), unless it has
already exhausted the good route’s capacity (line 9). Finally, if the buffering period runs out
before disclosure occurs, then i forwards p over the good or the bad route (line 13) based on
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Domain x
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Ri Ro
Pi Po
Figure 4.2 – Example.
P i andPo are the packet streams observed by nodes i and o,
Ri andRo are the sampled packet receipts of nodes i and o.
Attack parameters (unknown to us)
{lg ,dg } Loss/delay of good route
{lb,db} Loss/delay of bad route
g Fraction of trafﬁc sent over good route
t Buffering period
Symbols used in analysis
{lˆhon, dˆhon} Loss/delay estimates if node i is honest
{lˆmis, dˆmis} Loss/delay estimates if node i misbehaves
lˆhon− lˆmis Loss beneﬁt
dˆhon− dˆmis Delay beneﬁt
Table 4.2 – Attack parameters and symbols.
an arbitrary forwarding strategy (as long as, in the end, i forwards a fraction g of F ’s packets
over the good route and the rest over the bad route).
By varying the parameters t and g, we capture all rational behaviors of node i that involve no
more than two priority levels: (a) Honest behavior w/o prioritization: t = 0 and g = 0 (i does
not buffer and forwards all packets on the same route). (b) Honest behavior w/ prioritization:
t = 0 and g > 0 (i does not buffer and uses both routes). (c) Misbehavior: t > 0 and g > 0 (i
buffers and uses both routes). For any behavior where node i uses more than two priority
levels (more than two routes), it is trivial to show that there exists a behavior where i uses only
two priority levels (only the best and worst of its routes) and domain x achieves at least the
same perceived performance. Hence, if we prove that any prioritization attack captured by the
above model is unsuccessful, then we have also proved that any prioritization attack that uses
more priority levels is unsuccessful.
Themonitor estimates x’s loss and delaywith respect to F . When node i is honest, the expected
values of the mean loss and mean delay estimates are:
lˆhon = g · lg + (1−g) · lb, dˆhon = g ·dg + (1−g) ·db,
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Algorithm 3 PrioritizationAttack (p)
1: buffer p, start timer tm
2: while tm< t do
3: if disclosure for p then
4: if tm<κ then
5: forward p over bad route
6: else if p sampled then
7: forward p over good route
8: else
9: forward p over bad route
10: end if
11: end if
12: end while
13: forward p randomly over good or bad route
since a fraction g of the trafﬁc is forwarded over the good route, and the rest over the bad route.
When node i misbehaves, we denote the estimated mean loss and mean delay by lˆmis and
dˆmis, respectively.
We deﬁne the attack’s “loss beneﬁt” as lˆhon− lˆmis, and its “delay beneﬁt” as dˆhon− dˆmis. These
numbers quantify how much x exaggerates its perceived loss and delay performance by
misbehaving, taking into account that misbehavior involves buffering, which necessarily
delays packets.
It is trivial to show that the attack’s loss beneﬁt is always positive: The longer node i buffers
packets before forwarding them, the bigger the fraction of packets whose sampling fate is
disclosed to i before forwarding. Ultimately, if i does not mind introducing extra delay, it
can buffer every single packet long enough to learn its sampling fate and forward all sampled
packets over the good route, and all non-sampled packets over the bad route. This would
result in estimated mean loss rate lˆmis = lg and loss beneﬁt lˆhon− lˆmis = (1−g)(lb− lg ).
The interesting question iswhat happenswith the attack’s delay beneﬁt: underwhat conditions
does the cost of buffering packets outweigh the beneﬁt of sending some of the sampled packets
over the better route?
A clariﬁcation: Our attack model involves one good and one bad route, but the exact same
results can be achieved by considering multiple routes, of which the “best” has the same
features as our good route, and the “worst” the same features as our bad route. The gist is that
the misbehaving node i has a cheating opportunity because it can forward sampled packets
over a better route than non-sampled packets.
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4.4.2 Conditions for Resistance
Lemma 4.4.1. Let packets arrive as a stationary and ergodic process, disclosure arrivals form a
Bernoulli random process on the top of it, and quiet periods be long enough for the ergodicity
theorem to hold (i.e., assumptions stated in §1.5 hold). If node i attempts to predict the proba-
bility that each new packet from ﬂow F will be sampled, then its best prediction (given a perfect
estimate of F ’s packet rate r ) will be the same for all new packets from ﬂow F.
Proof. See section §4.7.5.
Lemma 4.4.1 says that, when packet p arrives at node i , the probability of p being sampled
is the same as for any other newly arrived packet. Hence, node i can have no probabilistic
beneﬁt from treating p preferentially, unless it buffers p for t > 0 and gains information on p’s
sampling fate from subsequent packet arrivals.
Lemma 4.4.2. If both of the following conditions hold:
κ> db−dg ; (4.1)
(1−δr )rκ ≥ 1
e
; (4.2)
then:
dˆhon− dˆmis < 0; (4.3)
d{dˆhon− dˆmis}
dt
≤ db−dg
κ
−1. (4.4)
Proof. See section §4.7.6.
Lemma 4.4.2 says that, if we set κ and δr such that Inequalities 4.1 and 4.2 hold, then: (a) The
attack’s delay beneﬁt is always negative (Inequality 4.3), which means that the misbehaving
domain x always worsens its perceived delay performance. (b) The attack’s delay beneﬁt
always decreases as the buffering period t increases (Inequality 4.4), which means that the
longer node i buffers packets to gain information about their sampling fate, the worse x’s
perceived delay performance becomes. In particular, if κ db−dg , then d{dˆhon−dˆmis}dt →−1,
which means that: for every msec that node i buffers a packet, it worsens x’s perceived delay
performance by almost one msec. In our opinion, given the importance of delay for modern
applications, no domain would choose to penalize its perceived delay performance this way
in order to exaggerate its loss performance.
We now provide intuition behind the two lemmas:
The intuition behind Lemma 4.4.1 is that the sampling fate of a new packet p depends only
on future events that are unpredictable at the moment of p’s arrival. In particular, packet
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p is sampled when two events happen: (1) the if-statement on line 15 of Alg. 2 is true and
(2) disclosure for p happens neither early nor late. Event (1) always happens with a ﬁxed
probabilityσ. Event (2) depends on when (after how many other packets) p’s disclosure packet
will arrive; this “distance-to-disclosure” follows a geometric distribution with parameter δr 1,
hence is memoryless, i.e., does not depend on p’s time of arrival or any prior packet arrivals.
The best node i can do is track F ’s packet arrivals, predict its average packet rate r until the
next disclosure packet, and compute an expectation of when Event (2) will occur. The result,
however, is the same for all new packets from F , hence node i cannot tell whether one new
packet is more likely to be sampled than another.
The ﬁrst condition of Lemma 4.4.2 is straightforward: the quiet period should be longer than
the delay difference between the bad and good route within the misbehaving domain. The
longer the quiet period, the longer node i needs to buffer p before learning its sampling fate.
By making the quiet period longer than the good-bad route delay difference, we ensure that i
cannot compensate for the buffering delay by sending p over the good route.
The second condition, however, is more subtle and something we did not expect—it emerged
from the math: the average fraction of packets that do not suffer early disclosure should be at
least 1/e. If disclosure for a packet p happens early (i.e., during a quiet period), node i learns
that p will not be sampled and cheats by forwarding p over the bad route. Increasing the quiet-
period duration does not help control this event—quite the contrary: longer quiet periods lead
to more early-disclosure events and more opportunities for this kind of cheating. Ultimately,
the amount of packets that suffer early disclosure could become large enough to saturate the
bad route; in this case, by forwarding all packets that suffer early disclosure over the bad route,
node i ends up forwarding all packets that do not suffer early disclosure—which include all
the sampled packets—over the good route. The second condition prevents this scenario. This
being a sufﬁcient (not necessary) condition, we do not have an intuitive explanation for why
the 1/e bound in particular works; it is the tightest bound we could ﬁnd that—together with
the ﬁrst condition—enabled us to prove that the delay beneﬁt is always negative, but a tighter
bound may exist.
4.5 Accuracy Analysis
To estimate a domain’s performance w.r.t. aggregateG , the monitor ﬁrst picks a target (γ,)-
accuracy, then computes the sample size N (number ofG ’s receipts) necessary for achieving it.
For this estimation, the monitor uses well-established statistical methods that assume either
i.i.d. loss of minimum rate lossmin or Gilbert loss of minimum rate lossmin and maximum
burst size burstmax [36]. The parameters of the loss model depend on the scenario: When
estimating the loss of a domain that promises maximum loss , lossmin should be set to
1If ﬂow F has packet rate r , each packet from F is chosen as a disclosure packet with the same probability δr ;
hence, the arrivals of F ’s disclosure packets form a standard Bernoulli stochastic process that is renewed at each
packet arrival from F .
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≤ ; the typical loss rate mentioned in today’s SLAs is 0.1% [11, 3, 8], so this is the default
value we use in our examples. When assuming Gilbert loss, we use burstmax = 2, because we
experimentally found that this value is conservative even for highly congested environments.
The monitor can achieve any target accuracy as long as it waits long enough to collect the
necessary number of receipts N . At the same time, we want to offer some notion of timeliness:
for an aggregate of a given packet rate, collecting the necessary number of receipts—hence
achieving a target accuracy—should take a predictable, reasonable amount of time.
Lemma 4.5.1. Given a ﬂow F arriving at a node with packet rate r , the expected number of
receipts that the node emits for F ’s packets per time period T is at least equal to N, if:
N ≤ r ·T ·
[
(1−δr )rκ− (1−δr )
r
R β
]
·σ. (4.5)
Proof. See section §4.7.7.
Informally, Lemma 4.5.1 says that it is possible to parametrize our algorithm such that the
monitor collects the necessary receipts to achieve a target accuracy in a timely manner. More
precisely, if we set a node’s β, κ, and δr according to Inequality 4.5, then the node emits at least
N receipts per time period T for any ﬂow with packet rate r . If an aggregate consists of one
or more such ﬂows, then the monitor achieves the target accuracy for it (collects N receipts)
within T . If an aggregate makes up 1n th of such a ﬂow, then the monitor achieves the target
accuracy for it within approximately n ·T .
We now provide intuition behind the lemma: The term on the right-hand side of Inequality 4.5
is the expected number of receipts emitted by the node per time period T for any ﬂow F
with packet rate r . We explain each term: r ·T is the expected number of packets from
F that arrive per T ; σ is the probability that a packet p from F is sampled given that its
disclosure is neither early nor late; and the term in brackets approximates the probability
that p’s disclosure is neither early nor late. More speciﬁcally, (1−δr )rκ approximates the
probability that p’s disclosure is not early, i.e., no packet that arrives within rκ after p is a
disclosure packet; (1−δr )
r
R β approximates the probability that p’s disclosure is late, i.e., none
of the F packets that are in the buffer when p’s receipt is overwritten are disclosure packets.
These are approximations, not exact probabilities; the exact probabilities depend on quantities
that we cannot predict (the number of packets that arrive after p within a κ-time period, and
the number of packets that arrive after p until p’s receipt is overwritten in the buffer). However,
due to the stationarity assumption, we can compute their expected values (r ·κ and rR ·β, resp.).
Moreover, due to the ergodicity assumption and the high rates r considered in this paper
(higher than OC-3c or OC-12 transmission rates), the actual values of the distances converge
to their expected values at a sub-second granularity. Because of this convergence, we can use
the expected values of the distances to approximately compute the probabilities of early and
late disclosure as summarized above.
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4.6 Parametrization and Resource Analysis
We now describe how to set the four parameters of our algorithm (Table 4.1) based on the
analysis of the last two sections (§4.6.3), then the resulting resource requirements (§4.6.4).
First, we set the selection rate σ—the probability with which a non-excluded packet is sam-
pled, hence the maximum sampling rate that our algorithm may apply to a ﬂow. In the
current Internet, we would set σ to 1% or so, which is typically supported by modern network
devices [10].
Second, we set the duration of the quiet period κ based on Lemma 4.4.2: Ideally, we want
κ db−dg , such that the delay beneﬁt of any prioritization attack not only is negative, but
drops as the buffering period increases with a rate of −1 (Inequality 4.4). Given that we cannot
know the value of db−dg for all prioritization attacks, we need to set κ conservatively, such
that it is signiﬁcantly larger than any realistic intra-domain route difference. In the current
Internet, we would set κ to 100msec or so.
Third, we compute each node’s buffer size β based on Lemma 4.5.1: (a) We pick the loss model,
i.e., lossmin and—if we assume Gilbert loss—burstmax , as well as the target accuracy that the
monitor should achieve given this model. From these, we compute the number of receipts
N that the monitor needs to collect per ﬂow in order to compute an estimate (computation
in Section §4.6.1). (b) We pick the time interval T and the minimum ﬂow packet rate rmin
for which the monitor should achieve the target accuracy. Given (a), (b), and each node’s
maximum total packet rate R, we analytically compute, from Inequality 4.5, the minimum
buffer size β that the node needs in order to emit N receipts per T time units from each ﬂow
with packet rate r ≥ rmin. (computation in Section §4.6.2). There are two important things to
node: (1) For each node, we compute β such that it is sufﬁcient for all packet rates above rmin.
(2) Across nodes, β can differ signiﬁcantly, because it depends on the maximum observed
total packet rate R.
Last, we pick the maximum ﬂow packet rate rmax for which the monitor should achieve the
target accuracy, and we deﬁne the disclosure function r → δr based on Lemmas 4.4.2 and 4.5.1:
Recall that δr is the probability with which a packet from a ﬂow of packet rate r is chosen
as a disclosure packet. For given values of σ, κ, and β, Lemmas 4.4.2 and 4.5.1 deﬁne the
“operational regime” of our disclosure process: the set of all possible disclosure functions that
both make prioritization attacks ineffective and result in the node producing at least the target
number of receipts N . We design our disclosure function such that any tuple {δr ,r } falls in
this operational regime and such that we use the smallest number of different disclosure rates
possible.
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4.6.1 Optimal Sample Size
We compute the minimum sample size N , that is required to achieve (γ,)-accuracy, using
statistics. In general, N is a function of the target accuracy and some distribution moment of
the quantity we want to estimate.
In this paper, we focus on packet-loss estimates, and since we do not know the distribution of
the actual loss in advance, we consider two practical options:
(a) Packet loss is a Bernoulli process: given the sequence of packets from ﬂow F that arrive at
node i , any packet is lost before reaching node j with probability l ≥ lossmin , and packet-loss
events are independent. In this case, the standard central limit theorem (CLT) yields a closed
formula for N :
N =
(η

)2
· 1− lossmin
lossmin
,
where η is the 1+γ2 -th quantile of the standard normal distribution.
(b) Packet loss is a bursty process governed by the Gilbert model [36]: which is based on a
Markov chain with two states: the process is either in a “low-loss” (good) or in a “high-loss”
(bad) state, and it transitions between the two with given probabilities. In this case, we can
approximate N empirically through Monte-Carlo simulations.
We can choose one of the two above options based on the nature of the measured trafﬁc (how
bursty we expect it to be). If we want to be conservative, we must choose option (b), which
yields a sufﬁcient sample size for both bursty and non-bursty trafﬁc; the disadvantage is that,
in the non-bursty case, the resulting sample size will be larger than necessary, i.e., we will use
more resources than necessary to meet our target accuracy.
Instead of focusing on packet-loss, we could have focused on estimates of average delay or
delay quantiles. In this case, optimal N for the mean delay estimation is again given by the
central limit theorem:
N =
(η

)2
· (CoVd )2,
where η is the 1+γ2 -th quantile of the standard normal distribution and CoVd is the coefﬁcient
of variation of the delay distribution. For computingCoVd , one must use a model describing
the delay distribution, which can be obtained by model ﬁtting methods on actual historical
data [18][31][51]. On the other hand, optimal N for a speciﬁc χ-quantile is given from the
theorem of the “γ-conﬁdence interval for the sample median and other quantiles” [55] [42]2:
N =
(η

)2
· 1−χ
χ
,
2The length of the conﬁdence interval for quantiles cannot be known in advance, because it is taken by two
speciﬁc x and y order statistics around the χ-th quantile of the sample, the actual values of which are be known in
advance. So, the relative error  of our (γ,)-target accuracy is deﬁned here as the index-difference (y −x) of the
conﬁdence interval bounds (instead of the interval between their values).
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where η is the 1+γ2 -th quantile of the standard normal distribution and 0<χ< 1. Comparing
the above to the closed formula for the loss estimation, one may verify that for quantiles
χ ≥ 0.5, the required sample size for measuring delay is always lower than the one needed
for loss, because typically lossmin << 0.5. Hence, in practice, a system conﬁguration for loss
estimation is already sufﬁcient for accurately measuring delay quantiles.
4.6.2 Minimization of buffer size β
In this section, we analytically derive the smallest buffer size necessary for an operational
regime to exist. In summary, we make condition from Lemma 4.5.1 an equality and solve
for β to obtain β(δr ,r ). This is a convex function of δr , and we minimize it over the range of
δr imposed by Lemma 4.4.2 to obtain β∗(r ) = minδr {β(δr ,r )}. This is the minimum buffer
size needed to produce N receipts for a ﬂow with packet rate r , and it is a monotonically
decreasing function of r . Hence, by setting a node’s buffer size to β∗(rmin), we ensure that the
node produces receipts at the target receipt rate for any ﬂow with packet rate r ≥ rmin.
Consider a ﬂow F , of packet rate r , which enters a domain at node i and exits at node j ;
we have derived conditions which guarantee that: the sample produced by nodes i and j is
sufﬁciently large for (γ,)-accuracy (Lemma 4.5.1) and representative even when node i is
launching a biasing attack (Lemma 4.4.2).
The minimum buffer size that satisﬁes Lemma 4.5.1 depends on input and workload parame-
ters (which are given), as well as algorithm parameters σ, κ, and δr . The values of σ and κ are
dictated, respectively, by practicality (§4.2) and attack-resistance (§4.4.2) concerns, which are
independent of the buffer size. The disclosure rate δr is restricted by Lemma 4.4.2. Hence, we
minimize the buffer size over the disclosure rate δr :
β∗ = min
δr∈
(
0, 1−e− 1rκ
) ln
(
(1−δr )rκ− Nr ·T ·σ
)
ln(1−δr )
r
R
. (4.6)
The objective function comes directly from Ineq. 4.5 in Lemma 4.5.1, and the minimization
range of δr comes directly from Ineq. 4.2 in Lemma 4.4.2. This is a convex function of δr , and
we ﬁnd numerically the disclosure rate δ∗r that minimizes it.
The minimum buffer size β∗ is a decreasing function of the ﬂow packet rate r , i.e., the lower
a ﬂow’s packet rate, the more memory we need to measure the loss rate experienced by the
ﬂow. We show this in Fig. 4.3a, where we plot β∗ as a function of r . Intuitively: To achieve
our target accuracy, we must lower-bound the probability of late disclosure to some value π
(because late disclosure reduces the sample size). For any given disclosure rate δr , there are
two ways to decrease the late-disclosure probability: increase the buffer size or increase the
packet rate. Hence, as the packet rate increases, the minimum buffer size necessary to reduce
the late-disclosure probability to π decreases.
Now consider the same domain and the same entry and exit point, but instead of a single
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Figure 4.3 – Minimum buffer size as a function of various parameters. κ= 100msec, = 10%, γ= 95%,
R = 2.5M packets/sec (which corresponds to a saturated OC-192 link assuming an average packet size
= 500 bytes).
The y-axis numbers assume a receipt size of 12 bytes.
ﬂow of constant packet rate, consider a set of ﬂows, each with a potentially different, variable
packet rate; our only assumption is that the packet rate of any of these ﬂows always falls within
a range [rmin,rmax], which is given as problem input.
We pick the buffer size β based on the smallest supported packet rate rmin:
β=β∗(rmin),
40
4.6. Parametrization and Resource Analysis
where β∗ is given by Eq. 4.6. Since the minimum buffer size is a decreasing function of the
ﬂow packet rate, the minimum buffer size that corresponds to the smallest supported packet
rate is sufﬁcient for all the other packet rates.
To provide concrete numbers, Figs. 4.3b and 4.3c show the resulting buffer size in various
realistic settings. For instance, for a minimum supported rate equal to rmin = 155K packets/sec
(which corresponds to a saturated OC-12 link assuming an average packet size = 500 bytes),
we see that a few MB of memory are typically sufﬁcient for measuring a minimum loss rate
of lossmin = 0.1% in T = 10 minutes. We also see that the buffer size drops rapidly as the
measurement period T and/or the minimum measurable loss rate lossmin increase. Intuitively,
the more time we can afford to reach a target accuracy, and the higher the loss rate that we
want to be able to measure accurately, the lower the necessary sampling rate, and the fewer
the resources necessary to provide it.
Clariﬁcation: We see that, for any selection rate, there always exists a minimum T and a
minimum lossmin at which β∗ becomes inﬁnite, i.e., at these points, we could not achieve the
target accuracy even with an inﬁnite buffer size. This is because, at these points, the number
of packets produced by the slowest ﬂows in our supported range falls below the minimum
necessary sample size.
4.6.3 Operational Regime
Fig. 4.4 shows an example operational regime. The particular scenario for which it was
computed does not matter for this discussion, but we provide it for completeness: target
accuracy (γ = 95%,  = 10%), target time interval T = 10min, minimum packet rate rmin =
155Kpps (saturated OC-12 interface, assuming average packet size 500B), maximum packet
rate rmax = 2.5Mpps (saturated OC-192 interface, assuming average packet size 500B), and
algorithm parameters σ= 1%, κ= 100msec, and β= 10.5MB. The operational regime consists
of the surface enclosed between the lower bound obtained from Ineq. 4.5 (blue curve) and
the smallest of the two upper bounds obtained, respectively, from Ineq 4.2 (yellow curve) and
Ineq 4.5 (red curve). In this particular example, the smallest upper bound is the former (the
yellow curve).
In more detail: (a) We analytically compute all the tuples {δr ,r } that satisfy Inequality 4.2
of Lemma 4.4.2: solving the inequality for r yields an upper bound for r as a function of
δr (the middle, yellow curve in Fig. 4.4). (b) We numerically3 compute all the tuples {δr ,r }
that satisfy the inequality of Lemma 4.5.1: solving the inequality for r yields an upper and a
lower bound for r as a function of δr (top/red curve and bottom/blue curve in Fig. 4.4). (c)
We divide [rmin,rmax] into non-overlapping packet-rate “zones” and map each zone to one
disclosure rate that falls between the lower bound and the smaller of the two upper bounds,
using as few zones as possible. In Fig. 4.4, we use two zones, shown on the ﬁgure as black
3We can only do this numerically. Solving Ineq. 4.5 for r analytically would require solving a polynomial of
degree
β
R −κ.
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Figure 4.4 – Example operational regime.
vertical lines: packet rates 155–437Kpps map to disclosure rate 2.18 ·10−5, while packet rates
155Kpps–2.5Mpps map to disclosure rate 0.137 ·10−5.
The disclosure function affects the implementation of our algorithm in the following sense:
The algorithm tracks each ﬂow’s packet rate r in order to choose disclosure packets from
that ﬂow with the right probability δr (lines 3,4 in Alg. 2). The fewer packet-rate zones we
use, the less precise our packet-rate tracking needs to be, which simpliﬁes our algorithm’s
implementation. For example, if we use two zones (as in the example of Fig. 4.4), then our
packet-rate tracking needs to be only precise enough to determine whether a ﬂow’s packet
rate falls in one zone or the other. We found 2 or 3 zones to be enough in all the scenarios we
considered.
Do we know that the operational regime is always computable—that, for any σ, κ, and β,
Lemmas 4.4.2 and 4.5.1 yield an upper and lower bound for r as a function of δ, and that, for
any ﬁxed δ, we can identify a closed range of packet rates r that honor the two bounds? This
was true in all the scenarios we considered, but we cannot prove it in the general case, because
step (b) of the computation (solving Ineq. 4.5 for r ) is numerical, not analytical. We can only
prove it in one particular, interesting case: when β becomes so large that it never overﬂows
(the probability of late disclosure becomes negligible for all ﬂows). In this particular case,
Ineq. 4.5 can be solved for r analytically and yields the following lower and upper bound:
W0
(Nκ
Tσ ln(1−δr )
)
κ ln(1−δr )
≤ r ≤ W−1
(Nκ
Tσ ln(1−δr )
)
κ ln(1−δr )
where W0 and W−1 are the two branches of the Lambert function. The exact formulas do not
matter—we provide them for completeness; the point is that, in this one case where we can
analytically compute the operational regime, it has the shape that we expect based on our
numerical solution.
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4.6.4 Resource Requirements
Having established how to set the parameters of our algorithm, we considered the values we
would use in various realistic scenarios and computed the resulting resource requirements.
Memory overhead: We found that our algorithm requires a buffer size β that increases data-
path memory only by a few percentage points, which is at least an order of magnitude less
than alternative algorithms.
We present a concrete example: Consider a node collocated with a 10GigE interface, observing
a total packet rate R = 2.5Mpps with an average packet size 500B. Assume 12B per receipt. We
set σ= 1% and κ= 100msec. We set target accuracy (γ= 95%,= 10%), within a time interval
of T = 10min, assuming i.i.d. loss of minimum rate lossmin = 0.1% (e.g., we are verifying SLAs
that promise loss rate below 0.1%). We set rmax = 2.5Mpps, which is the maximum packet
rate at which a ﬂow could arrive at this node. Fig. 4.5 shows the amount of data-path memory
required by our algorithm, as well as various alternatives, as a function of rmin (the minimum
supported ﬂow packet rate).
Our algorithm (red line, abbrev. “retro”) requires a few MB of data-path memory, whereas basic
delayed disclosure (green circles, abbrev. “basic DD”) requires at least an order of magnitude
more. To put this in perspective, a 10GigE interface needs about 125MB of packet buffers
(using the “one round-trip worth of trafﬁc” rule and assuming a typical Internet round-trip of
100msec), i.e., our algorithm increases data-path memory only by a few percentage points.
There are three reasons why our algorithm requires less data-path memory: (a) Basic DD
samples more packets than necessary to achieve the target accuracy in the target time interval,
because it tries to achieve a target sampling probability, not the target accuracy in the target
time interval. (b) Basic DD uses a ﬁxed disclosure rate δ, yet no single δworks well for all ﬂows:
faster ﬂows need a lower δ to prevent early disclosure from happening too often, while slower
ﬂows need a higher δ to prevent late disclosure from happening too often. Basic DD picks a δ
that is low enough to accommodate the fastest ﬂows (those with packet rate rmax) and, as a
result, requires too much memory to protect the slowest ﬂows (those with packet rate rmin)
from late disclosure. (c) Basic DD avoids late disclosure more than necessary to achieve the
target accuracy in the target time interval, because it was designed to avoid late disclosure
with a ﬁxed, high probability.
To quantify the impact of each issue, Fig. 4.5 shows the data-path memory required by up-
graded versions of basic DD: (a) Basic DD+optimal N is like basic DD, except it tries to achieve
the target accuracy in the target time interval. (b) Basic DD+optimal N+zones moreover uses
an adaptive disclosure rate, though it still computes the disclosure function so as to avoid
late disclosure with a ﬁxed, high probability. (c) Retro—our algorithm—uses an adaptive
disclosure rate and computes the disclosure function so as to achieve the target accuracy in
the target time interval. We see that each issue plays a non-trivial role, with the last one being
the most impactful: avoiding late disclosure improves accuracy but requires a bigger receipt
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packet rate.
buffer; hence, it is important to avoid it just enough to achieve the target accuracy in the target
time interval, but not with an arbitrarily high probability.
Processing overhead: Our algorithm requires a small number of hash computations, times-
tamp comparisons, and accesses to data-path memory per packet, which is similar to basic
delayed disclosure (we claim no improvement on processing overhead). The exact numbers
depend on the implementation; the hardware design sketched in the Appendix, Section 4.3,
requires per packet: two hash computations, a couple of timestamp comparisons, one read
and one write access to data-path SRAM, and a parallel lookup and an update to data-path
CAM.
4.7 Experimental Evaluation
After describing our methodology (§4.7.1), we demonstrate that our algorithm is useful (§4.7.2),
conﬁrm that it works as expected (§4.7.3) and is resistant to prioritization attacks (§4.7.4).
4.7.1 Methodology
In each experiment, we emulate some number of ﬂows, crossing one or more domains. We
use 1-hour backbone traces made available by CAIDA in 2016 (chicago-equinix, direction
A). Each ﬂow observed at an entry node consists of one entire trace, while the total trafﬁc
observed at an entry node consists of multiple traces merged into one. Why this particular
emulation: The question we are most frequently asked is how well our system would work for
busy backbone routers located at the Internet core. The trafﬁc rate of a single CAIDA trace
ranges from a few hundred Mbps to a few Gbps; this is too low to represent the total trafﬁc
arriving at a busy backbone-router interface, but could represent, e.g., the trafﬁc between
a source and destination preﬁx connected to the Internet through OC-48 or lightly loaded
10GigE links. By merging multiple traces—and shifting packet timestamps such that all traces
start at the same time—we created higher-rate ingress streams.
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In each experiment, we emulate either i.i.d. or bursty loss (of various rates). For the latter,
we obtained the loss pattern from an actual congested link: we created in our lab a simple
topology where 16 pairs of end-points communicated over a bottleneck GigE link, and we had
each pair exchange back-to-back TCP ﬂows; this resulted in the bottleneck link experiencing
packet loss of average rate 4.8% and burstiness 1.52 packets.
Our conﬁguration is purposefully not realistic in all scenarios, because we want our algorithm
to operate at its limits. For instance, in a real deployment, we would set lossmin = 0.1% or so.
However, if the actual loss rate is  lossmin , our algorithm will use signiﬁcantly more memory
than necessary to estimate this loss rate, and our results will be obviously good. Hence, we
set lossmin to the actual loss rate, which results in our algorithm using the absolute minimum
memory needed to estimate this loss rate. So:
(a) In all experiments, we set the selection rate to σ= 1%, the quiet-period duration to κ=
100msec, the target accuracy to (γ= 95%, = 10%), and the target time interval to T = 10min.
(b) In all experiments, we set lossmin to the actual loss rate and—when the actual loss is
bursty—burstmax to the actual loss burstiness. This way, we test how accurately the monitor
estimates loss that is exactly at the limit of what the nodes were conﬁgured to handle.
(c) In §4.7.2, we set rmin to the average packet rate of the target ﬂow F . This way, we test how
accurately the monitor estimates loss experienced by a ﬂow whose packet rate is exactly at
the limit of what the nodes were conﬁgured to handle. This way, we test how accurately the
monitor estimates loss experienced by a ﬂow whose packet rate is exactly at the limit of what
the nodes were conﬁgured to handle. For the same reason, in §4.7.3, we set rmin to the average
packet rate of the slowest ﬂow involved in the experiment.
(d) In §4.7.4, where node i launches prioritization attacks, we conﬁgure the nodes such that
the average packet rate of the target ﬂow F falls exactly on the upper bound of the operational
regime (the middle, yellow curve in Fig 4.4). This is the most challenging setting we could think
of: if node i operates close to the upper bound of the operational regime, it is possible that F ’s
instant packet rate ﬂuctuates so fast that it temporarily pushes node i out of the operational
regime, where it could potentially cheat.
4.7.2 Use Cases
First, we demonstrate that our algorithm enables the monitor to draw useful conclusions
about network behavior.
In each experiment, we emulate two to four ﬂows that enter an ISP x at node i and exit at node
o. Both nodes are collocated with highly loaded 10GigE interfaces. We use four CAIDA traces.
The total trafﬁc observed at node i consists of the four traces merged together and has a rate
of 8Gbps.
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Figure 4.6 – Loss estimates after T = 10min.
SLA veriﬁcation. ISP x has signed an SLA with a customer network, promising loss below
0.1%; the customer’s trafﬁc suffers exactly 0.1% loss within x. On the customer’s request, the
monitor estimates x’s loss with respect to trafﬁc from the customer’s preﬁx to four popular
destination preﬁxes (so, we have four aggregates, each corresponding to a ﬂow). Fig. 4.6a
shows the monitor’s loss estimates with respect to each aggregate/ﬂow after the target 5min
time interval; in each boxplot, the red line shows the median, while the limits of the boxplot
indicate the 95% conﬁdence interval. We see that all estimates achieve the target accuracy
(γ= 95%, = 10%). Hence, y correctly determines that x is borderline violating its SLA.
Cheap SLA veriﬁcation. Same as above, but this is a cheaper SLA, promising loss below 5%;
the customer’s trafﬁc suffers 4.8% loss with burstiness 1.5 due to a congested bottleneck link
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at x’s core. Fig. 4.6b shows that the monitor’s loss estimates achieve the target accuracy after
the target 5min time interval. Hence, y correctly determines that x is honoring its SLA, despite
the fact that it is introducing loss just below the promised maximum.
Subtle preﬁx discrimination. Transit ISP x is dissatisﬁed with networks y and z: the former is
a popular video provider; the latter is an eyeball ISP whose customers freely participate in peer-
to-peer networks; x wants to renegotiate its peering agreement with each of these networks,
but they are resisting. In response, x subtly discriminates against them: while most transit
trafﬁc experiences loss 0.1%, y ’s and z’s trafﬁc experience, respectively, 0.15% and 0.3% loss.
After user complaints, the monitor estimates x’s loss with respect to two random ﬂows, one
ﬂow originating from y , and one ﬂow originating from z (so, again, we have four aggregates,
each corresponding to a ﬂow). Fig. 4.6c shows that the monitor catches the discrimination
after the target 5min time interval.
Policing of SYN packets. ISP x has signed an SLA with a customer network, promising loss
below 0.1%; it honors this SLA for all but TCP SYN packets, which are policed such that they
experience 3–30 times higher loss (we conducted 240 experiments with various policing rates).
The customer observes end-to-end that something is wrong with connection setup and asks
the monitor whether x is discriminating against its SYN packets. In response, the monitor
deﬁnes two aggregates: SYN packets from the customer’s preﬁx to some popular destination
preﬁx; all other packets with the same source and destination preﬁx. So, in this case, we have
two aggregates that are subsets of the same ﬂow.
The challenge is that the SYN aggregate is relatively small, and the monitor would need to
collect receipts for hours in order to estimate x’s loss with respect to the SYN aggregate with the
target accuracy of (γ= 95%,= 10%). However, the goal here is not to estimate x’s performance,
but to determine whether it treated the two aggregates differently. This can be done much
faster, with a simple Maximum Likelihood differentiation detector: the monitor estimates
x’s loss rate for each aggregate based on the receipts it collects within some period of time
(minutes, not hours); and computes the corresponding conﬁdence intervals (CI); if the lower
limit of the CI for the SYN aggregate estimate is greater than the upper limit of the CI for the
no-SYN aggregate, then the monitor concludes that x discriminates against the SYN aggregate.
Our results, after the target 5min time interval: When x’s loss with respect to SYN packets
is 5 or more times higher, the monitor detects differentiation with probability 100% (in all
experiment runs); when SYN loss is 3–5 times higher, detection rate is ≥ 94%; for subtler
differentiation, detection rate drops sharply. For completeness, we also ran 480 experiments
where x does not differentiate, and the monitor correctly detects no differentiation.
4.7.3 Basic Operation
Next, we conﬁrm that our algorithm works as it should, i.e., the nodes sample consistently at
the necessary rates.
47
Chapter 4. Unbiased reporting
ys
iys oys
yd
iyd oyd
xs
ixs oxs
xd
ixs oxs
d
id
s
os
10GigE 40GigE 100GigE 40GigE 10GigE
Figure 4.7 – Topology emulated in §4.7.3.
We emulate the topology in Fig. 4.7: there are 4 ﬂows between edge networks s and d ; 6
additional ﬂows enter and exit the topology, respectively, at regional ISPs xs and xd ; and 22
additional ﬂows enter and exit, respectively, at Tier-1 ISPs ys and yd . Hence, we use a total
of 32 CAIDA traces. The total packet rates observed at nodes os , oxs , and oys are, respectively,
1.92, 4.81 and 15.47Mpps (equiv. 7.67, 19.2 and 61.8Gbps). There is i.i.d. loss of rate 0.2%
inside domain xs and 0.1% inside domain ys .
Fig. 4.8 shows, for each ﬂow, the consistent sample size (the number of consistently sampled
packets) produced within the target time interval by all the nodes that observed the ﬂow. For
instance, Fig. 4.8a shows the consistent sample size produced by each of the 4 ﬂows observed
by all 10 nodes; Fig. 4.8c shows the consistent sample size produced by each of the 32 ﬂows
observed by nodes oys and i yd . In all plots, the horizontal red line shows the minimum sample
size N needed to estimate i.i.d. loss of minimum rate lossmin = 0.1% with the target accuracy.
We see that, for all ﬂows, the produced consistent sample size exceeds the minimum necessary.
In particular, Fig. 4.8a shows that all 10 nodes sample consistently at the necessary rate, despite
the fact that they observe total packet rates that differ by an order of magnitude; this is because
each node’s receipt buffer is large enough to accommodate the maximum total packet rate that
the node may observe. Moreover, Fig. 4.8c shows that nodes oys and i yd sample consistently at
the necessary rate from all 32 ﬂows that they observe in common; this is because each node is
conﬁgured to produce at least the minimum sample size for all ﬂows with packet rate ≥ rmin.
4.7.4 Resistance to Prioritization
Finally, we conﬁrm that our algorithm makes prioritization attacks ineffective, whereas basic
delayed disclosure allows a misbehaving network to signiﬁcantly exaggerate its performance.
ISP x launches a prioritization attack (§4.4.1) against one target ﬂow. The delay of the two
routes is db = 50msec and dg = 10msec (the good route is 5 times faster than the bad one).
We vary the attack parameter g (the fraction of trafﬁc that ﬁts in the good route) from 0 to
100%, and the attack parameter t (the buffering period) from 0 to 120msec. We measure the
attack’s relative delay beneﬁt: by how much the misbehaving domain exaggerates its perceived
delay performance relative to the delay performance it would achieve without a prioritization
attack.
Fig. 4.9a shows the results. The y-axis measures the attack’s relative delay beneﬁt (in percent-
age points), while the two x-axes measure, respectively, the attack parameters t (in msec)
and g (in percentage points). We do not obtain the plotted data points from our formulas, but
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Figure 4.8 – Consistent sample size after T = 10min.
experimentally, as the monitor would compute them from the receipts produced by x’s entry
and exit nodes.
We see that the attack’s relative delay beneﬁt is always negative and as low as −1122% (by
misbehaving, x worsens its perceived delay performance by this much). The highest delay
beneﬁt is close to 0, and it occurs when t → 0, at which point x almost does not buffer/cheat.
The lowest delay beneﬁt occurs at t = 120msec and g → 1. At this point, x forwards most
packets over the 10msec good route, while it buffers sampled packets for 120msec. As a result,
relative to an honest behavior (where it would not buffer and its performance, both true and
perceived, would be almost 10msec), x worsens its relative delay beneﬁt by almost −1200%.
This is consistent with the math in the proof of Lemma 4.4.2, which shows that x’s misbehaving
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Figure 4.9 – Relative delay beneﬁt of a prioritization attack as a function of attack parameters t and g.
function is convex w.r.t. t and concave w.r.t. g, hence the lowest delay beneﬁt occurs when
either g → 0 or g → 1.
One might expect that basic delayed disclosure would also handle prioritization attacks well,
without the added complexity of quiet periods and an adaptive disclosure rate. To show that
this is not the case, we repeat the experiment, but have node i run basic delayed disclosure
instead of our algorithm. To cheat, node i buffers each packet p for t or until disclosure occurs,
whichever comes ﬁrst; if disclosure comes ﬁrst and p is sampled, node i forwards p over the
good route, otherwise, it forwards p such that, overall, a fraction g of all packets are forwarded
over the good route. We conﬁgure basic delayed disclosure with β= 4.2MB (the same amount
used by our algorithm) and δ= 9.9∗10−5, σ= 1% (as advised in [14]).
We see, in Fig. 4.9b, that there existmultiple prioritization strategies—multiple {g, t} combinations—
where the attack’s delay beneﬁt is both positive and signiﬁcant, as high as +41% (by misbehav-
ing, x improves its perceived delayed performance by this much). The intuition is that x does
not need to know the sampling fate of all the packets it forwards in order to exaggerate its
perceived delay performance; knowing the sampling fate of a small fraction of the forwarded
packets is enough, and this knowledge can be gained with a surprisingly short t that does
not introduce signiﬁcant delay overhead. As a result, without counter-measures in place,
prioritization attacks defeat the purpose of delayed disclosure.
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4.7.5 Proof of lemma 4.4.1
Let F (resp. P ) denote the stationary and ergodic point process with intensity r (resp. R) that
corresponds to the packet arrivals from ﬂow F (resp. to the packet arrivals of the total trafﬁc
observed by node i ). P and F are two point processes of the same stationary continuous-time
arrival process. Their intensities (R and r ) are just two different event “clocks” of that process:
P-clock ticks every time that a packet arrives and F -clock ticks only if the arriving packet
belongs to ﬂow F .
Consider a packet p from ﬂow F arriving at node i at random time t = 0; that is, an F -point
occurs at an arbitrary point in time4. Xp denotes the number of F -points until p’s disclosure
packet arrives (which is also an F -point occurrence); nF [0,κ] denotes the number of F -points
that occur a time interval κ after t = 0; nF
[
P0,Pβ
]
denotes the number of F -points that occur
in the upcoming β P-points after p.
Packet p is sampled when the following three events occur: (a) the disclosure of p is not early,
i.e., Xp > nF [0,κ]; (b) neither is it late, i.e., Xp ≤ nF
[
P0,Pβ
]
; and (c), p is selected by line 15 of
Alg. 2.
Therefore, p’s sampling probability P0(a,b,c), as computed at time t = 0 is given by the chain
rule of probability:
P0(a,b,c)=P(a) ·P(b|a) ·P(c|a,b) (4.7)
The last partP(c|a,b) of Eq. 4.7 is equal to the selection rateσ. The ﬁrst two parts are computed
based on the following observation: In Alg. 2, DiscHash has strong randomization properties,
which means that the arrivals of the disclosure packets occur independently over the F -arrivals
and with equal probability δr . I.e., the disclosure arrivals form a Bernoulli stochastic process
on the top of F -arrivals, which is renewed at each F -point. Therefore, for any arbitrary packet
p of ﬂow F , the “distance” until the disclosure packet Xp, counted in F -points, follows the
geometric distribution:
P(a) ·P(b|a)=
=P(Xp >nF [0,κ]) ·P(Xp ≤nF [P0,Pβ] | Xp >nF [0,κ])
=P(Xp >nF [0,κ]) · (1−P(Xp >nF [P0,Pβ] | Xp >nF [0,κ]))
=P(Xp >nF [0,κ]) · (1−P(Xp >nF [P0,Pβ]−nF [0,κ]))
= (1−δr )nF [0,κ] ·
(
1− (1−δr )nF[P0,Pβ]−nF [0,κ]
)
= (1−δr )nF [0,κ]− (1−δr )nF[P0,Pβ], (4.8)
4For this proof, we use the same convention as in Palm Calculus [42]: t = 0. This convention is the one used to
give a meaning to an arbitrary point in time and differs from the beginning of the process; it is the time of arbitrary
point in a process that has a stationary regime and has run long enough to be in steady state.
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where the third derivation step is because of the memoryless property of the geometric
distribution.
Given Eq. 4.7 and 4.8, the sampling probability of packet p is:
P0(a,b,c)=
(
(1−δr )nF [0,κ]− (1−δr )nF[P0,Pβ]
)
·σ (4.9)
Main proof
To prove lemma 4.4.1, it is sufﬁcient to show that the sampling probability P0(a,b,c) that node
i can predict upon p’s arrival does not depend on p’s arrival time (t = 0), and it is equal for
all packets from ﬂow F . We will use the same assumption of Section §1.5, which we restate
here for completeness: P and F are stationary, ergodic, and both intensities r and R are high
enough that the ergodic convergence occurs in less than 100msec, i.e., in time less than the
typical values for κ.
Stationarity of point processes implies that: distributions of the number of points in a ﬁxed
interval (t ′1, t
′′
1 ] are invariant under translation, i.e., is the same for (t
′
1+h, t ′′1 +h] for all h. An
immediate consequence is that the distribution of the number of points nF in an interval
depends only on the length of the interval and not its time origin [22].
Therefore, the distributions of nF [0,κ] and nF
[
P0,Pβ
]
depend only on κ and β and not on the
time that p is observed. They are the same at any arbitrary point in time.
As for any random variable, the best prediction for nF
[
P0,Pβ
]
and nF [0,κ] is obtained using
their expected values. This is true because if one wants to predict a random variable from its
distribution, then the mean-square-error (MSE) predictor and the best one-number guess is
just its expected value [1].
We compute the expected values of nF [0,κ] and nF
[
P0,Pβ
]
using Palm Calculus [42]:
E [nF [0,κ]]= r ·κ (4.10)
E
[
nF
[
P0,Pβ
]]= r
R
·β (4.11)
Eq. 4.10 is an immediate consequence of the deﬁnition of the intensity of a stationary point
process, which is equal to the expected number of points per time unit. Eq. 4.11 requires the
auxiliary lemma 4.7.1 (provided at the end of this section), and linearity of expectation.
By applying Eqs. 4.10 and 4.11 to Eq. 4.9, we see that the best prediction of the sampling
probability of an arbitrary packet p, as computed at the time of arrival, does not depend on
p’s arrival time or any other previously observed packet arrival. It only depends on the the
intensities R and r . Even if node i manages to estimate perfectly R and r , when it attempts to
predict the sampling probability of each new packet p that it observes, it computes the same
sampling probability for all new packets.
52
4.7. Experimental Evaluation
A longer version:
In the rest of this section, we provide a longer version of this proof starting from the ergodicity
assumption, which is implied in the above results based on Palm Calculus.
The ergodic theorem [33] for weakly5 stationary processes implies that: for each weakly
stationary process, the time average of the process converges to a random variable that has
the same expected value. Let F (t) denote the continuous-time arrival process of F -point
occurrences and FP [ j ] denote the arrival process of the same F -point occurrences according
to the P-event clock. I.e., F (t) (resp. FP [ j ]) is 1, if an F -point occurs at time t (resp. at P-
point j ) and 0 otherwise. From the deﬁnition of processes F and P , F -events are a subset
of P-events; hence, process F is stationary in both continuous time and P-event clock. Let
also the random variables to which the time averages converge be Y and YP . Then, given
that convergence rates are fast due to our assumption of high packet arrival rates, the ergodic
theorem suggests that:
1
κ
∫κ
0
F (t )dt
m.s.−−−→ Y
1
β
β∑
j=1
FP [ j ]
m.s.−−−→ YP
Because of the deﬁnition ofnF [0,κ] andnF
[
P0,Pβ
]
, we have the following: nF [0,κ]=
∫κ
0 F (t )dt
and nF
[
P0,Pβ
]=∑βj=1FP [ j ]. So, nF [0,κ] and nF [P0,Pβ] converge to κ ·Y and β ·YP , respec-
tively.
We obtain the MSE (best) predictor for nF
[
P0,Pβ
]
and nF [0,κ], by computing the best pre-
dictors for Y and YP ; i.e., E [Y ] and E [YP ]. From ergodicity, we get: E [Y ] = E [F (0)] and
E [YP ]= E [FP [1]] (same mean condition above); and from the deﬁnition of the intensity r of
process F and lemma 4.7.1, we get: E [F (0)]= r and E [FP [1]]=πF = rR .
Therefore, the best predictions for nF
[
P0,Pβ
]
and nF [0,κ] are:
nF [0,κ]= r ·κ (4.12)nF [P0,Pβ]= rR ·β (4.13)
By applying the best predictions to Eq. 4.9, we see that the sampling probability is independent
of p’s arrival time and is the same for all packets from ﬂow F .
Note 1: The geometric distribution requires only an integer exponent of (1−δr ). This is
because in the PMF of a geometrically distributed random variable the exponent denotes the
number of trials until the success, which must be an integer. But, in our case, rκ and rRβ are
5Weak stationarity is enough for the proof of our theoretic results. There is no need to assume strong stationarity,
which is already impractical to verify in real trafﬁc traces.
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not necessarily integer values. Another way for computing the probabilities P(a) and P(b|a)
would be to regard the arrivals of the disclosure packets as a Poisson arrival process, which
is the continuous-time equivalent of the Bernoulli. In this case, X would be exponentially
distributed with rate δr . However, if the exponents of the geometric distribution are generally
large and the probability δr is relatively small (which holds in our case as shown in Fig. 4.4),
then the probabilities obtained using the geometric distribution approximate very well the
ones obtained by the exponential distribution. In this work, we have used the geometric
distribution, because we believe it provides more intuitive results. A similar analysis holds
when considering a Poisson arrival process for the disclosure packets.
Note 2: Lemmas 4.4.1 and 4.7.1 (below) do not imply any assumption about independence of
F -arrivals, nor Poisson packet arrivals. The proofs are based on Palm Calculus and linearity of
expectation, that do not require independence. The only assumptions here are stationarity
and ergodicity. The “steady-rate”or the Poisson assumption make the computation of Eq. 4.11
easier and provide a good insight of the proof, but do not correspond to real trafﬁc arrival
patterns.
Lemma 4.7.1. Given two point processes P and F of the same stationary process, which have
rates R and r , respectively, the probability of an arbitrary P-arrival to be an F-arrival (i.e the
arrived packet belongs to ﬂow F), is:
πF = r
R
Proof. We base our proof on the concepts of Palm Calculus [42].
Let λF (P ) denote the intensity of the P point process measured with the event clock F . Also,
let nF [P0,P1] denote the number of points of process F that fall between the two random
subsequent P points P0 and P1.
Apply Neveu’s Exchange Theorem [42] to obtain:
λF (P )= R
r
and E (nF [P0,P1])= 1
λF (P )
.
Note that nF [P0,P1] is 1, if the packet at P0 is an F packet, i.e. if the P point at P0 is also an F
point, and 0 otherwise. Hence, E (nF [P0,P1]) is the probability πF that an arbitrary packet is a
packet from ﬂow F . Thus:
πF = λ(F )
λ(P )
= r
R
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4.7.6 Proof of lemma 4.4.2
The main part of the proof consists of an analysis of the expected misbehavior beneﬁt w.r.t.
t and g. A node launches a prioritization attack only if its expected misbehavior beneﬁt is
non-negative. We work with expectations because the actual (ﬁnal) misbehavior beneﬁt is not
known to the node (or anyone else) at the time that it observes trafﬁc; it can be computed only
when the measurement ends. We consider all possible cases for t > 0 and g ∈ (0,1) and show
that Ineq. 4.1, 4.2 are sufﬁcient to make the expected misbehavior beneﬁt negative:
MBd < 0 (4.14)
Case a: t ≥κ
In this case the exact computation of the misbehavior beneﬁt is not easy, but it is enough to
commute an upper bound and show that it is negative.
Since t ≥ κ, the monitor’s delay estimate cannot be less than the delay of the good path
(achieved when all samples happen to follow the good path) plus κ:
dˆmis ≥ dg +κ (4.15)
Given now the deﬁnition of the misbehavior beneﬁt, we get the following upper bound:
MBd := dˆhon− dˆmis
= g ·dg + (1−g) ·db− dˆmis
≤ (1−g)(db−dg)−κ
(4.1)< −gΔd ≤ 0
Thus, Ineq. 4.1 implies Ineq. 4.14, i.e., the condition about κ given by Ineq. 4.1 is sufﬁcient to
guarantee that a prioritization attack of Case (a) is unsuccessful.
Case b: t <κ
For this case, we divide the packets forwarded by a misbehaving node i that performs a
prioritization attack into two categories:
• Category I: The packets for which disclosure happens within t. Node i knows that these
are excluded from the sampling process, because they fall into the quiet period κ, and it
forwards them over the bad path.
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• Category II: The packets for which disclosure does not happen within t (hence, each of
them is buffered for t before being forwarded). Node i knows that a subset of these will
not be excluded, and a subset of the non-excluded ones will be sampled, but it does not
know which subsets these are. Hence, it forwards as many as it can over the good path
and the rest over the bad path.
Misbehavior Beneﬁt Function
LetΔd = db−dg be the delay difference of the two paths and m(t) denote the expected fraction
of packets for which disclosure happens within t (packets of Category I described above).
Let also t, denote the buffering time at which the bad path is saturated with packets whose
disclosure happens during their buffering period and therefore their exclusion for the sampling
process is veriﬁed by the misbehaving node. I.e.:
m(t)= 1−g (4.16)
Given the attack model that is described in §4.4.1, for any g ∈ (0,1), the expected misbehavior
beneﬁt takes the following form w.r.t. t:
MBd =
{
gm(t)
1−m(t)Δd− t if 0< t ≤ t(
1−g)Δd− t if t ≥ t (4.17)
Computation of the upper branch of Eq. 4.17:
Due to its deﬁnition, m(t) is an increasing function of t. Hence:
m(t)≤m(t)
(4.20)⇐==⇒m(t)≤ 1−g
⇔ g
1−m(t) ≤ 1 (4.18)
Ineq. 4.18 shows that the packets of Category II exceed or exactly match the capacity of the
good path. In this case, the node forwards as many of these packets as it can (i.e. g1−m(t) ) over
the good path and the rest (i.e. 1− g1−m(t) ) over the bad path. It does so, because this is the only
way it never exceeds the capacities of both paths and it maximizes the number of packets of
Category II (from which the sample will be selected) that follow the good path.
Note that the exact algorithm, with which the node manages to perform the above policy at
line rates, is not required for this proof. I.e. we consider here the best possible misbehaving
scenario that is offered to the node because of the domain’s network conditions. This makes
our analysis a worst-case approach.
The monitor always produces an accurate delay estimate, based on a sample of packets of
56
4.7. Experimental Evaluation
Category II. Hence, the expected6 value of estimated mean delay of the domain is:
dˆmis = g
1−m(t)
(
dg + t
)+(1− g
1−m(t)
)
(db+ t) (4.19)
Based on Eq. 4.19, we obtain the upper branch of Eq. 4.17:
MBd =g ·dg + (1−g) ·db− dˆmis
(4.19)= − g−gm(t)−g
1−m(t) dg − t
+ 1−g−m(t)+gm(t)−1+g+m(t)
1−m(t) db
= gm(t)
1−m(t)Δd− t, ∀t ∈
[
0, t
]
.
Computation of the lower branch of Eq. 4.17:
At the buffering time t = t, the capacity of the bad path is saturated with packets of Category
I, and, because of Eq. 4.20, the misbehavior beneﬁt becomes MBd (t
)= (1−g)Δd− t. I.e. all
sampled packets follow the good path.
If the node buffers for time t > t, then the packets will be delayed for more time, while
all non-excluded packets will continue to follow the good path. So, dˆmis = dg + t and thus
MBd =
(
1−g)Δd− t.
Upper bound for Eq. 4.17:
We can compute an upper bound for the expected misbehavior beneﬁt using an upper bound
for the expected fraction of packets of Category I, i.e., m(t).
Given a disclosure probability δr and a buffering period t, for any packet from ﬂow F that
arrives at time t0, the probability that its disclosure packet arrives within period t follows
the geometric distribution with parameter δr , and it is equal to: 1− (1−δr )nF [t0,t0+t], where
nF [t0, t0+ t] is the number of packets from ﬂow F that fall inside the time interval (t0, t0+ t].
Therefore, since nF [t0, t0+ t] is random variable, the actual fraction of packets of Category I is
also a random variable.
An upper bound for the expected fraction of packets of Category I m(t) can be found using
our stationarity assumption (§1.5) and Jensen’s Inequality: Due to that ﬂow-F packet arrivals
6The exact estimate cannot be known in advance because it is produced from the collected sample, but the
estimate will be very close to the expected value. This is because the number of packets of Category II is smaller
than the total ﬂow trafﬁc. This, in turn, means that the collected sample (as computed in §4.6.1) is larger than
necessary to estimate the average delay of those packets with adequate accuracy. By ﬁxing γ and  to reasonable
values (e.g. γ= 95% and = 10%), the accuracy of dˆmis is, almost surely, adequately high.
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form a stationary and ergodic point process with intensity r , nF [t0, t0+ t] is a random variable
whose distribution is invariant under time shifts, i.e., it is the same for any t0.
Also, from the deﬁnition of the intensity r (which is the expected number of points per time
unit [42]), the expected value of nF [t0, t0+ t] is: E [nF [t0, t0+ t]]= r t, for any t0 ≥ 0.
Last, since the function 1−(1−δr )nF [t0,t0+t] is concave w.r.t. nF [t0, t0+ t], from Jensen’s Inequal-
ity we get:
m(t)≤ 1− (1−δr )r t (4.20)
Given Ineq. 4.20, we now obtain an upper bound for the expected misbehavior beneﬁt MBd :
MBd ≤
{
g(1−(1−δ)r t)
(1−δ)r t Δd− t if 0< t ≤ t(
1−g)Δd− t if t ≥ t (4.21)
We denote the right hand side of the above with maxMBd . I.e.:
maxMBd =
{
g(1−(1−δ)r t)
(1−δ)r t Δd− t if 0< t ≤ t(
1−g)Δd− t if t ≥ t (4.22)
Analysis of Eq. 4.22:
The upper branch of Eq. 4.22 is a convex function of t, while the lower branch is a decreasing
function of t. To see why, we provide hereunder the ﬁrst and second derivatives of maxMBd .
One can verify that the second derivative (Eq. 4.24) of the upper branch is non-negative and
the ﬁrst derivative (Eq. /4.23) of the lower branch is negative.
d(maxMBd )
dt
={
gΔd
(−r (1−δr )−r t ln(1−δr ))−1 , 0< t ≤ t
−1 , t ≥ t (4.23)
d2(maxMBd )
dt2
=
=
{
gΔd (−r ln(1−δr ))2 (1−δr )−r t , 0≤ t ≤ t
0 , t ≥ t (4.24)
Since the maximum misbehavior beneﬁt maxMBd is a continuous function of t, that is convex
in
[
0, t
]
and decreasing for t ≥ t, then, for any g ∈ [0,1], the function takes its maximum
value at one of the edges of the support of its upper branch, i.e. t = 0 or t =min{κ, t} (because
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of the general assumption of Case b: t < κ). At t = 0, MBd (0)= 0, while at t = t, the sign of
MBd depends on the actual values of g, δr and κ.
Moreover, the maximum misbehavior beneﬁt maxMBd is decreasing with t
. We obtain a
lower bound for t directly from Ineq. 4.20 and Eq. 4.16:
t ≥ lng
r ln(1−δr )
(4.25)
Thus, to show that the conditions of lemma 4.4.2 about κ and δr (i.e. Ineqs. 4.1 and 4.2) imply
Ineq. 4.14, it is sufﬁcient to show that, when they hold, then:
maxMBd
(
min
{
κ,min
{
t
}}
,g
)
=maxMBd
(
min
{
κ,
lng
r ln(1−δr )
}
,g
)
< 0, ∀g ∈ [0,1] (4.26)
In this case, the expected misbehavior beneﬁt MBd is always non-positive, for any possible t
and g. We will show this, by considering two sub-cases w.r.t. g:
Case b1: (1−δr )rκ ≥ g
Using this assumption, we get:
lng
r ln(1−δr )
≥κ⇒min
{
κ,
lng
r ln(1−δr )
}
= κ. (4.27)
Therefore,
(4.26)
(4.22),(4.27)⇐======⇒MBd (κ,g) <
(
1−g)Δd−κ
(4.1)< −gΔd ≤ 0.
Thus, Ineq. 4.1 implies Ineq. 4.26, i.e, the condition about κ given by Ineq. 4.1 is sufﬁcient to
guarantee that a prioritization attack of Case (b1) is unsuccessful.
Case b2: (1−δr )rκ < g
Using this assumption, we get:
lng
r ln(1−δr )
<κ (4.28)
Since min
{
t
}= lngr ln(1−δr ) < κ, no conditions about κ exist that provide an upper bound for
the maximum possible beneﬁt at t =min{t}. At that time, the node manages to forward over
the bad path only excluded packets, which equivalently ensures that all the remaining packets,
among which the non-excluded ones, are forwarded over the good path. Moreover, at that
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time, the maximum beneﬁt depends on the values of g and δr and it cannot be bounded only
through the choice of κ. It is necessary to properly set δr , too.
We consider again Ineq. 4.26 and show why 4.1 and 4.2 are sufﬁcient to guarantee the require-
ment.
(4.26)
(4.22),(4.28)⇐======⇒(1−g)Δd− lngr ln(1−δr ) < 0
⇔ −1
rΔd ln(1−δr )
> g−1
lng
(4.29)
First, we need to prove the following auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 4.7.2. lng ≤ g−1
Proof. Take the Taylor expansion of lng around g0 = 1:
lng = lng0+
(
g−g0
) dlng
dg
∣∣∣∣
g=g0
+ 1
2
(
g−g0
)2 dlng
dg2
∣∣∣∣
g=ξ
, for some ξ ∈ [g0,g]
= ln(1)+ (g−1) 1
1
+ 1
2
(
g−1)2 (− 1
ξ2
)1
The last term of the above is always non-positive. Thus,
lng ≤ 0+ (g−1)
Because of lemma 4.7.2, we get that g−1lng ≤ 1.
Now, we go back to Ineq. 4.29. To show that the inequality is satisﬁed, it is enough to show
that the left hand side (LHS) of the inequality satisﬁes the following: LHS(Ineq. 4.29)> 1, for
some δr ∈ (0,1). But,
- if (1−δr )rκ ≥ 1e (i.e. Ineq. 4.2 holds), then:
(1−δr )rκ ≥ 1
e
⇔ ln((1−δr )rκ)≥−1
⇔ rκ ln(1−δr )≥−1
⇔ −1
rκ ln(1−δr )
≥ 1. (4.30)
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- if additionally κ>Δd (i.e. Ineq. 4.1 holds), then:
1
Δd
> 1
κ
⇔ −1
rΔd ln(1−δr )
> −1
rκ ln(1−δr )
(4.30)===⇒ −1
rΔd ln(1−δr )
> 1
(lem.4.7.2)=======⇒ −1
rΔd ln(1−δr )
> g−1
lng
→ (4.29,4.26) hold
Hence, if an attack is considered unsuccessful according to Ineq. 4.14, then Ineq. 4.1 and 4.2
are sufﬁcient to guarantee that an attack of Case (b2) is unsuccessful.
In conclusion, by considering both cases (a) and (b), we have showed that for any t > 0 and
any g ∈ (0,1), Ineq. 4.1 and 4.2 are sufﬁcient to make a prioritization attack unsuccessful.
Proof of Inequality 4.4
The inequality can be derived directly from Eq. 4.23 and 4.2:
d(MBd )
dt
≤
{ g
(1−δr )−r tΔd (−r ln(1−δr ))−1 , t ≤ t

−1 , t ≥ t
(4.2)==⇒ d(MBd )
dt
≤
{ g
(1−δr )−r tΔd
1
κ −1 , t ≤ t
−1 , t ≥ t
And because for t ≤ t (4.25)⇐=== g < (1−δr )−r t , the above results in:
d(MBd )
dt
≤
{
Δd
κ −1 , t ≤ t
−1 , t ≥ t
Δd
κ
>0
===⇒ d(MBd )
dt
≤ Δd
κ
−1
4.7.7 Proof of lemma 4.5.1
To prove this lemma it is enough to prove that the expected sample size after time T w.r.t a
ﬂow with rate r is:
r ·T ·
[
(1−δr )rκ− (1−δr )
r
R β
]
·σ
Let the number of packets that are observed at a node in a measurement period T be M . Then
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Figure 4.10 – Actual sampling probability.
the corresponding sample size nM in time T will be have the following expected value:
E [nM ]=
M∑
j=1
1{j-th pkt is sampled} ·p j (4.31)
where p j is the sampling probability of j -th packet of the ﬂow to be sampled.
For this proof, we approximate the actual number of packet arrivals with the expected values.
The sampling probability p j of each packet j depends only on the exact number of ﬂow F ’s
packet arrivals in a period of κ time following j , and the exact number of packet arrivals before
j is dropped from the circular buffer. Because of stationarity (§1.5), the expected values of
these numbers are r ·κ and rR ·β, respectively. Also, due to ergodicity and the very high packet
rates that are considered in this paper (R’s that correspond to rates higher than OC-12), the
actual number of packet arrivals converges to its expected value at a sub-second granularity
(less than 100msec, which are the typical values for κ). So, the exact number of packets that
arrive in time κ can be approximated by r ·κ. Therefore, we can approximate p j with:
p j ≈
[
(1−δr )rκ− (1−δr )
r
R β
]
·σ,
where the term (1−δr ) comes from the Bernoulli arrival process of the disclosure packets over
the F packet arrivals.
To verify the latter approximation, we have computed the “actual” sampling probability of
all packets in real ﬂow traces. We used the same ﬂow traces as the ones in our evaluation
section, and for every packet j in the trace we have computed p j without making the above
mentioned approximations of the number of packets in time κ or in the buffer β. In all cases,
we found that the approximation works very well in practice. Fig. 4.10 depicts an example
20-sec trace case (Equinix-chicago April 2016). The actual and the approximated probabilities
for all packets are indeed very close packets.
To complete the proof, we may also take M ≈ r ·T . Due to the larger time T , this approximation
is even better.
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Using the above approximations into Eq. 4.31, we ﬁnally get:
E [nM ]=M ·
[
(1−δr )rκ− (1−δr )
r
R β
]
·σ
= r ·T ·
[
(1−δr )rκ− (1−δr )
r
R β
]
·σ
which implies the lemma’s statement.
Instead of the approximation for the sampling probability, we could use a similar approach
to the one that was followed for the derivation of Ineq. 4.20 in Section §4.7.6, to ﬁnd an
lower bound for E [nM ] using Jensen’s inequality: E [nM ]≥
[
(1−δr )rκ− (1−δr )
r
R β
]
However, as
showed in our experiments, due to the fast ergodic convergence this bound is tight enough
that an equality can be used instead of inequality.
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5 Topology-obfuscation reporting
In this chapter, we describe how to achieve goal G2: the trafﬁc receipts that a domain emits
should not disclose information about the domain’s internal topology. Internet service
providers typically consider their internal topology to be private information. Therefore,
we study "topology-discovery" attacks, where the monitor (or any adversary who has access to
the same information as the monitor, e.g., a government that subpoenas the receipts collected
by the monitor) tries to use the receipts emitted by a domain in order to reverse-engineer
the domain’s internal topology. Starting from the observation that internal topology can be
revealed through the diversity of intra-domain path delays, we design receipts that obfuscate
this information. A key challenge we face is that topology obfuscation requires a special kind of
receipt manipulation, which is something that our incentive-compatible reporting (Chapter 3)
was designed to penalize. We show that it is possible to obfuscate topology and at the same
time emit receipts that enable the monitor to make correct decisions and yield correct domain
ratings.
First, we state our trust model (§5.1). Then we describe our general approach (§5.2) and two
speciﬁc algorithms that implement it (§5.3). We close with a brief experimental evaluation
(§5.4).
5.1 Trust model and problem statement
The receipts that a domain emits can leak information that is otherwise private: It has been
shown that an entity with access to measurements of a network’s paths can use network tomog-
raphy to infer the network’s topology [30, 29, 19, 27, 57]. Today, obtaining such measurements
is typically hard, as it requires coordination and trust between large numbers of end-users.
Our transparency system, however, changes this, as it requires the participating domains
themselves to publish measurements of their network paths.
In the context of this chapter, the monitor (or any adversary who has access to the same infor-
mation as the monitor) may misbehave by launching “topology-discovery” attacks: consider
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the receipts that a domain emits and use network tomography in an effort to infer the domain’s
internal topology. We assume that the monitor uses a perfect tomographic algorithm: if a
domain emits correct receipts as described in the last two chapters, the monitor correctly
reconstructs the domain’s internal topology without error. We make this assumption because
we want to base our solution on fundamental weaknesses of network tomography that pose
hard limits on how well an adversary can infer network topology, as opposed to imperfections
of particular tomographic algorithms.
Given this trust model, we want to design an algorithm for producing receipts that enables the
monitor to make correct decisions (as speciﬁed in Chapter 3), but prevent the monitor from
inferring internal domain topology.
We restate the assumption from Section §1.5 that is relevant to this chapter: Domains know
the true loss and delay of their own inter-domain links. For any given aggregate G and any
given domain z onG ’s path, the neighbor domains of z know the true loss/delay performance
of their inter-domain link with z with respect toG’s packets.
5.2 Approach
In this section, we describe our approach. First, we describe how topology inference works
(§5.2.1) and how we can prevent it in principle (§5.2.2). Then, we explain the rationale behind
our algorithms (§5.2.3).
5.2.1 Topology inference
Topology inference exploits the diversity of the pairwise similarities (either covariances or
correlations) of network-path delay vectors. An (intra-domain network) path is deﬁned by the
pair of its entry and exit nodes. The delay vector of a path is the vector of the delays experienced
by the sequence of sampled packets that entered and exited, respectively, at these nodes.
Consider the topology in Fig. 5.1. Packets entering the domain at node a and exiting at either
b
a
c
R
Domain
Figure 5.1 – Example of topology inference on a simple logical topology.
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node b or node c travel along the same path until router R. Consider two packets that enter
back-to-back at a and exit, respectively, at b and c . Topology inference assumes that these two
packets experience highly correlated delays before router R (because they encounter the same
network conditions) and uncorrelated delays after router R (because they follow different
paths after R). Given these assumptions, the covariance of the path delays of back-to-back
packets that follow paths a,b and a,c leaks information about the amount of shared physical
topology between the two paths. Covariance, however, is sensitive to the delay variances of the
involved paths. Hence, topology-inference algorithms estimate the "pairwise similarity" (the
amount of shared physical topology between two paths) based on the correlation coefﬁcient
of the delay vectors of the two paths: cor r ({a,b}, {a,c})= cov({a,b},{a,c})
var ({a,b})var ({a,c})
.
Given the pairwise similarities of a domain’s paths, a topology-inference algorithm proceeds
in two steps: First, for each set of paths with a common entry node, it reconstructs the likeliest
tree topology based either on agglomerative clustering [27, 57, 16, 30, 29] or maximum
likelihood [19]. Agglomerative clustering resolves the hierarchical clustering of a set of objects
with pairwise similarity values by ﬁnding the maximum similarity element and merging the
rows/columns of the similarity matrix corresponding to those two end-hosts, then ﬁnding
the next maximum element and merging those rows/columns of the similarity matrix to the
new maximum element. In contrast to clustering strategies, maximum likelihood techniques
use a global maximum-penalized likelihood criterion for topology identiﬁcation. Second, the
algorithm merges all the reconstructed trees to reconstruct the entire topology [20].
5.2.2 Topology Obfuscation
Our approach is to alter the timestamps of (some of) the domain’s emitted receipts, so that
any pairwise similarities that the monitor might compute are negligible. By doing so, we target
the fundamental reason that enables topology inference, which is the existence of different
pairwise similarities between network path delays. Alternatively, we could have exploited the
sources of error of speciﬁc topology-inference algorithms. However, a domain cannot know in
advance which algorithm will be used to infer its topology. By reporting pairwise similarities
(close to) 0, it ensures that any such algorithm will fail.
We face two challenges:
(1) Our solution must scale with the number of the domain’s intra-domain paths. This pre-
cludes a straightforward solution that considers all path pairs and all possible timestamp
changes (and tries to ﬁnd one that makes all pairwise similarities 0). Instead, we design an
obfuscation algorithm that can be applied individually to each path or ﬂow.
(2) Our solution must not penalize domains for obfuscating their topologies. In Ch. 3, we
designed decision and rating functions precisely to penalize domains that manipulate their
receipts. Hence, we need a solution that somehow enables domains to change the timestamps
on some of their receipts without affecting the decision and rating functions, hence without
getting penalized.
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Algorithm 4 ChangeTimestamps (ﬂowID)
Ri all receipts for ﬂowID that initially computed by entry node i
Ro all receipts for ﬂowID emitted by exit node o
R′i all new receipts for ﬂowID emitted by entry node i
Obfuscate() algorithm that creates topology-obfuscation (altered) delay vector
j index for the delay vector
1: delaySamples← {}
2: for each ro ∈Ro do
3: Find receipt ri from node i with ri.digest = ro.digest.
4: delaySamples( j )← ro.timestamp− ri.timestamp
5: j ← j +1
6: end for
7: delaySamples′ ←Obfuscate(delaySamples)
8: for each ro ∈Ro do
9: Find receipt ri from node i with ri.digest = ro.digest.
10: ri.timestamp← ro.timestamp−delaySamples′( j )
11: j ← j +1
12: end for
13: OutputR′i andRo.
Alg. 4 presents our “altered-timestamps” approach: It takes as input the sequences of the
true receiptsRi andRo that a domain’s entry node i and exit node o would emit w.r.t. ﬂow F ,
and it outputs the sequences of receipts that the two nodes should emit in order to obfuscate
the domain’s internal topology. For each receipt that the two nodes compute for the same
sampled packet, Alg. 4 computes the intra-domain delay for that packet and adds it to the
delay vector delaySamples (lines 1-6). Then, an Obfuscate() algorithm alters the elements of
the delay vector so that they leak no information about the domain’s internal topology, i.e., the
covariance between this delay vector and the delay vector of any other ﬂow that exited the
domain from another exit node is close to 0 (line 7). Finally, Alg. 4 alters the timestamps of the
entry node’s receipts, such that the sequence of sampled packets appear to have experienced
the obfuscating delays delaySamples′ (lines 8-13).
5.2.3 Rationale
Given a ﬂow F , Alg. 4 changes the timestamps emitted by the ﬂow’s entry node. We made this
choice for two reasons:
First, by hiding the true entry timestamps from the monitor, we prevent it from identifying
the packets that would be most helpful for topology inference. Even through the monitor has
access to all the receipts from all the ﬂows observed by a domain, if it does not know the true
entry timestamps, it cannot identify packet pairs like the one in Fig. 5.1 (packets that enter the
domain back-to-back at the same entry point and exit at different points).
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Second, changing only the entry timestamps is simpler, in that each change affects the per-
formance of a single inter-domain link in a predictable way. The alternative would be to
change both the entry and exit timestamps, which would affect the performance of both of the
domain’s inter-domain links, hence the ratings of both of the domain’s neighbors. Controlling
the impact of the change on the ratings of all the involved domains would require complex
coordination among the domains.
We discuss the Obfuscate() algorithm in the next section, but state here the conditions that it
needs to satisfy: The last and most important point is how the algorithm works.
1. Applying Obfuscate() to each ﬂow observed by a domain should make the pairwise
covariances of all ﬂow delay vectors be (close to) 0. This is equivalent to the following
condition: once normalized such that their means are zero, the altered delay vectors of
all ﬂows should form an (almost) orthogonal basis.
2. Obfuscate() should not signiﬁcantly impact the monitor’s decisions and the domains’
ratings. This precludes straightforward solutions, e.g., based on Gram-Schmidt orthogo-
nalization.
5.3 Solution
We present two algorithms for topology obfuscation that are built on scrambling: they take
as input a vector of intra-domain delays experienced by a sequence of sampled packets; and
they produce as output a permutation of these delays. Hence, by construction, a domain that
uses our algorithm alters its receipt timestamps in a way that does not affect the intra-domain
delay distribution that can be estimated from the domain’s receipts. This approach has two
advantages related to our condition (2): First, it does not affect the monitor’s delay estimates
(mean, variance, percentile) of any intra-domain path. Second, it does not affect the monitor’s
mean delay estimate of any inter-domain link. However, depending on how the scrambling
occurs, it may affect the monitor’s delay variance and percentile estimates of inter-domain
links.
We avoid random scrambling because it does not scale. A randomly chosen permutation of
the input delays will most likely not meet our two conditions: it will not make all the pairwise
similarities close to 0, and it will affect the monitor’s delay variance estimates of inter-domain
links. Hence, to meet our two conditions, we would need to consider all pairs of ﬂows and
search over all possible combinations of permutations. If the length of the input delay vectors
is N (equal to the sample size) and the number of ﬂows is NF , then the complexity of this
search is O
(
N2 · (NF2 )).
To reduce complexity, each algorithm scrambles its input delay vector such that the outcome is
as close as possible to another, specially crafted vector. Let D be the input delay vector (which
is computed from the true receipts of the entry and exit nodes), andQ be another, specially
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crafted vector of equal size. Also, letC :D×Q →R be a cost function for the assignment.
Deﬁnition 5.3.1 (Assignment problem1). Given D, Q and C, ﬁnd a bijection b : D →Q that
minimizes the aggregated cost:
∑
d∈D C (d ,q).
The solution of the above problem assigns every element of D to an element ofQ. Let D[ j ],
j = 1, . . . ,N , be the elements of D andQ[k], k = 1, . . . ,N , be the elements ofQ. The minimizing
bijection of the solution is just a mapping of the indices j to the indices k. As a result, we obtain
a new order of the elements of D that “follows” the indices k ofQ. This permuted version of D ,
which we denote withD ′, is the output of theObfuscate() algorithm, i.e. Obfuscate(D)=D ′. We
say that Obfuscate(D) “maps” its input vector D to vectorQ with minimum cost, by reordering
its elements.
In our ﬁrst algorithm, Obfuscate1(), vectors D are mapped to vectorsQ that are chosen from
an orthonormal basis (i.e. meet our condition (1) by construction) and we design the cost
function C such that D ′ is as close as possible to a chosen Q. In our second algorithm,
Obfuscate2(), each vector D is mapped to a vectorQ that contains the delays between entry
node i ’s predecessor node (the exit node of the previous domain) and exit node o of the path
which is related to D . And we design the cost function C such that the output vector comes as
close as possible to meeting our conditions (1) and (2). We can minimize the cost function
in polynomial time using the standard solution to the assignment problem: the Hungarian
algorithm [48], which has complexity O(N3).
5.3.1 Obfuscate1(): Assignment to Fourier orthogonal basis
This algorithm maps the input delay vector to a vector that belongs to the Fourier orthogonal
basis. So, for each input delay vector D,Q is a real-time cosine signal of frequency f , where
f = 0, . . . ,N −1. The frequencies are chosen randomly but differently for each D. The cost
functionC is the L2-norm of the vector (D−Q). Hence, the assignment algorithm minimizes
the mean square error of reporting D ′ =Obfuscate(D) instead of Q: since Q is a cosine of a
single frequency, D ′ is a noised version ofQ, where the noise is minimized.
The intuition behind this algorithm is the observation that the covariance of two delay vectors
is almost equivalent to their dot product (they differ only by a ﬁxed factor 1/N). Given that each
scrambled vector is "close" to a vector that belongs to the basis (a cosine signal with a given
frequency), then the covariance of any two scrambled vectors will be "close" to 0.
Any orthogonal basis could work; we chose the Fourier basis because of its ﬂexibility and its
well-established theory: Using Discrete Fourier Transforms (DFT), we can design the basis to
contain only a small set of frequencies that are far apart from one another such that any noise
1Another way to formulate the assignment problem is by considering a complete bipartite graph with N vertices
corresponding to the elements d of the delay vector D, N vertices corresponding to the elements q of special
vectorQ, and where each edge has a non-negative costC (d ,q). Then, an assignment is a perfect matching with
minimum cost.
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effect is amortized. Also, given any two delay vectors, D ′1 and D
′
2, we can reason about their
dot product (and their covariance) in the time domain 〈D ′1,D ′2〉 by looking at the product of
their DFT spectra (Parceval Theorem).
5.3.2 Obfuscate2(): Assignment to extended-path delays
In this algorithm, if the input vector D contains the delays w.r.t. ﬂow F between node i and
node o, the vector Q contains the delays w.r.t. F between node i ’s predecessor and node o.
We specify the cost function as a matrix where element [k, j ] indicates the cost of assigning
element D[ j ] to elementQ[k]: C (D,Q)[k, j ]=
((
Q[k]−D[ j ])2− var (Q−D))2+D[ j ] ·D[k].
The intuition behind this algorithm is the following: with Obfuscate2() we want to achieve
obfuscation without affecting the inter-domain link delay variance var
(
X ′
)
, according to
our condition (2). However, we cannot add directly var (X )− var (X ′) to the minimization
objective of the assignment problem, because X ′ depends on D ′, which is the assignment
solution; we need a vector that remains unchanged by obfuscation. The only vector that has
this property and is related to both X and X ′ is: Q = (D+X )= (D ′ +X ′).
The ﬁrst term of the cost function
((
Q[k]−D[ j ])2− var (Q−D))2 helps minimize the change
in the estimated variance of the inter-domain link between node i ’s predecessor and node i
that is due to obfuscation; this minimizes the impact of obfuscation on the decision and rating
functions, according to our condition (2). The second term of the cost function (d [ j ] ·d[k])
helps minimize the dot product between true and scrambled delay vectors, hence make the
two as less correlated as possible; this targets to achieve close-to-zero pairwise similarities,
according to our condition (1).
5.4 Experimental evaluation
Wenow conﬁrm that our two obfuscation algorithms indeed obfuscate the pairwise similarities
between delay vectors, i.e., the information that enables topology inference.
We use synthetic tree topologies of different sizes and shapes: complete balanced binary trees,
complete unbalanced binary trees and ternary trees of depth 2. In each topology, we assign to
each link a ﬁxed propagation delay and a random queueing delay per packet. Queuing delays
are chosen from a Weibull distribution with with scale parameter 0.5 and a shape parameter
that varies uniformly in the interval [0.6,0.82] for each link, according to the analysis of single-
hop queuing delays in [51].
In each experiment, we emulate the scenario where a sequence of packets from multiple ﬂows
enter domain z at the same entry node i (the root of one of our tree topologies). Each ﬂow
follows a different path through z and exits at a different node (a leaf of the topology). For each
ﬂow F , domain z runs Alg. 4, which alters the timestamps of F ’s receipts emitted by node i .
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This affects the monitor’s delay estimates for: (a) The inter-domain link that F traverses before
entering z. We denote by XF and X ′F , respectively, the original and scrambled vectors of this
inter-domain link w.r.t. F . (b) The intra-domain segment that F traverses within z. We denote
by DF and D ′F , respectively, z’s original and scrambled intra-domain delay vectors w.r.t. F .
At the end of each experiment, we compute how useful our obfuscation algorithms were in pre-
venting topology inference. In particular, we compute the covariance of each pair of original
delay vectors DFi and DFj and compare it to the covariance of the corresponding scrambled
delay vectors D ′Fi and D
′
Fj
. Every time the original vectors have signiﬁcant covariance while
the scrambled vectors do not, our obfuscation algorithms were useful. Also, to measure the
impact on the inter-domain link we compute and compare the variances of each XF and X ′F .
We consider two types of scenarios:
[I] XF is independent from DF . In this case, the inter-domain delays are chosen similarly to
the intra-domain delays, based on a Weibull distribution.
[II] XF is correlated to DF with correlation coefﬁcient ρ ∈ (−1,1).
The purpose of the type [II] scenarios is to explore the limits of Obfuscate2(). Recall that
our second obfuscation algorithm maps each ﬂow’s original intra-domain delay vector DF
to vector (XF +DF ). Even though the algorithm tries to ﬁnd a mapping such that D ′F is not
correlated to DF (through the second term of its cost function), this becomes increasingly
hard as the correlation between DF and XF increases. Hence, we would like to assess the
algorithm’s performance as a function of the correlation coefﬁcient ρ. In practice, we expect
ρ < |0.2|, i.e., DF and XF to be loosely, if at all, correlated, because of the high rate and diversity
of the trafﬁc that crosses inter-domain links.
All our topologies yielded similar results. Hence, we present results from only one topology: a
complete balanced tree of depth 5, with 31 links, 16 paths, and one ﬂow traversing each path.
The mean intra-domain propagation delay was set to 50msec. The mean and variance of each
inter-domain delay vector XF were set to 10%, respectively, of the mean and variance of the
corresponding intra-domain delay vector DF .
Figs. 5.2 and 5.3 depict our results in scenario [I]. In the upper two ﬁgures, we plot the co-
variances and correlation coefﬁcients of 8 ﬂow pairs that share the longest path inside the
tree topology, i.e., they have 4 common links and only the last link before their exit is differ-
ent for each ﬂow. These ﬂow pairs are the hardest to obfuscate, because their initial delay
vectors are the most highly correlated. In the third ﬁgure, we plot the inter-domain delay
variances XF and X ′F for each ﬂow. We see that Obfuscate1() performs better with respect to
our condition (1), i.e., obfuscating internal domain topology: the correlation between the
scrambled intra-domain delay vectors is always close to 0. This is not the case for Obfuscate2(),
although it still reduces correlation signiﬁcantly—the correlation coefﬁcient of the scrambled
intra-domain delay vectors is below 0.2 in 50% of the cases. On the other hand, Obfuscate2()
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performs better with respect to our condition (2), i.e., preserving the variance of inter-domain
links: the variance of each scrambled inter-domain delay vector X ′F follows closely that of the
original delay vector XF . This is not the case for Obfuscate1(), which increases the estimated
inter-domain link variance by 3-4 times.
Figs. 5.4 and 5.5 depict our results in scenario [II] with respect to a particular ﬂow pair [F1,F2].
Flows F1 and F2 share one of the longest common intra-domain paths and exit the tree
topology from two nodes that are siblings. In the upper two ﬁgures, we plot the covariance and
correlation coefﬁcient of pair [F1,F2] as a function of the intra- and inter-domain correlation
coefﬁcient ρ. In the third ﬁgure, we plot the delay variances of ﬂow F1: XF1 and X ′F1. We see
thatObfuscate1() obfuscates well independently from inter/intra-domain correlation, whereas
Obfuscate2() obfuscates increasingly worse when ρ > 0.4.
In the end, there exists a fundamental trade-off between truthfully reporting a domain’s
performance and obfuscating its internal topology: To obfuscate internal domain topology, we
need to hide certain information about intra-domain delay. We can do this without affecting
the monitor’s mean delay estimates, but we need to affect some of the monitor’s delay-variance
estimates. The question is which ones. We chose to not affect the estimated delay variance
of intra-domain segments (in order to preserve the incentives of our decision mechanism).
But this means that we need to affect the estimated delay variance of inter-domain links. Our
two obfuscation algorithms make different choices: Obfuscate1() obfuscates as well as it can
without worrying about inter-domain delay variance. Obfuscate2() tries to preserve inter-
domain delay variance as much as possible, but obfuscates less well. The two of them together
illustrate the best that can be done while considering only the principle behind topology
inference (the pairwise similarities of delay vectors). We do think that better obfuscation
algorithms can be designed, but that would require considering speciﬁc topology-inference
algorithms and exploiting their limitations. We leave this to future work.
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Figure 5.2 – Results of Obfuscate1() in scenario I.
[F1,F2] [F3,F4] [F5,F6] [F7,F8] [F9,F10] [F11,F12] [F13,F14] [F15,F16]
0
2
4
6
8
covariances
initial
Obfuscate2()
[F1,F2] [F3,F4] [F5,F6] [F7,F8] [F9,F10] [F11,F12] [F13,F14] [F15,F16]
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
correlations
initial
Obfuscate2()
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
variances
initial
Obfuscate2()
Figure 5.3 – Results of Obfuscate2() in scenario I.
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Figure 5.4 – Results of Obfuscate1() in scenario II.
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Figure 5.5 – Results of Obfuscate2() in scenario II.
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6 Related Work
Network confessional (same problem, similar approach):
The closest work to ours is Network Confessional [14], which shares the same goal about
incentive-compatible and unbiased reporting, but offers no privacy-preserving guarantees
for the reporting domains. Network Confessional also involves consistent packet sampling
and relies on a basic idea of delayed disclosure to avoid sampling bias: when a network node
observes a packet p, it cannot immediately determine whether it should sample p or not,
because that information is disclosed by subsequent trafﬁc; by the time disclosure happens,
the node has normally forwarded p, hence cannot treat it according to its sampling fate.
Basic Delayed Disclosure (which is how we call the sampling algorithm proposed in [14], to
differentiate it from ours) is promising, however, an analysis of the algorithm reveals ﬂaws:
First, vulnerability to subtle prioritization attacks (§4.7.4), where a misbehaving network
buffers packets long enough to learn their sampling fate with a non-trivial probability, yet
short enough not to introduce signiﬁcant buffering delays; we show that such an attack
enables a misbehaving network to claim signiﬁcantly less loss and delay (as much as 41% in
our experiments) than it actually introduces. Second, in many realistic scenarios, achieving
good accuracy in a timely manner requires many tens of MBs of data-path memory per 10Gbps
of forwarding capacity (§4.6); at this cost, we might as well use a completely different approach
from sampling, e.g., maintain explicit per-ﬂow loss and delay information on the data-path,
which is not vulnerable to prioritization attacks in the ﬁrst place.
Our contribution is a sampling algorithm that builds on basic delayed disclosure, but corrects
these ﬂaws: First, it is provably robust to prioritization attacks (§4.4). Second, it provably uses
the minimum amount of data-path memory necessary for achieving a desired accuracy in a
desired time interval (§4.5). As a result, it achieves good accuracy in a timely manner, while
requiring a modest amount of resources, affordable by modern networks; for instance, in
the same scenario where basic delayed disclosure requires many tens of MBs of data-path
memory per 10Gbps of forwarding capacity, our algorithm requires only a couple of MB—an
order of magnitude less (§4.6). To achieve these properties, we enhance delayed disclosure
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with carefully regulated “quiet periods,” during which no sampling may occur, and with a
new disclosure process, which is continuously adapted to the observed trafﬁc. These two
techniques allow us to control the pace of disclosure, such that we emit no more receipts than
necessary and make prioritization attacks ineffective: by the time a misbehaving network has
learned the sampling fate of a packet, it has buffered—hence delayed—the packet for so long
that it cannot beneﬁt from prioritization any more. Our experimental evaluation conﬁrms our
analysis using real trafﬁc traces (§4.7).
The Network Confessional paper assumed that prioritization attacks would be too expensive
to implement in practice, but we disagree; in fact, without proper defense, even buffering
for a few msec can yield a signiﬁcant beneﬁt to a misbehaving domain. The paper did not
offer any analytical security or efﬁciency argument about how much such an attack can
affect the monitor’s estimates. This assumption has deep implications for the system’s design:
If a node never buffers packets, then there is no need for quiet periods; as a result, the
nodes need a much smaller receipt buffer, which in turn removes the need for adaptive
disclosure rates. Moreover, the bias/accuracy analysis becomes trivial (one just needs to
make the receipt buffer large enough to avoid frequent overﬂows). In short, if we ignore
prioritization attacks, the problem becomes signiﬁcantly simpler. The Network Confessional
paper acknowledges this issue and references a technical report that discusses it; however,
even that report does not include a bias/accuracy analysis nor offer a complete, practical
solution (for instance, it sketches a solution that requires 200MB of fast memory for a 10GigE
link, whereas we require less than 5MB for a 40GigE link). The core of our contribution lies
in our analysis of why/how our disclosure process with properly regulated quiet periods
and adaptive disclosures penalizes prioritization attacks and achieves a target accuracy with
modest resources.
Secure reports for fault localization (same problem, different approaches):
Apart from network confessional, delayed disclosure has been mentioned twice in the context
of packet sampling for fault localization [60, 61], but none of these proposals offers in-band
disclosure process: sampling nodes are explicitly told which packets to sample, either by
end-hosts or by a central controller.
Zhang et al. were the ﬁrst to mention delayed disclosure, as part of their PAAI-1 proposal [60].
However, they did not explore the idea in depth or include any bias/accuracy analysis; they
only proposed that an end-host that sends out a packet and wants this packet sampled by the
network should send an explicit sampling request some time after the packet: upon receiving
a packet, a node computes a trafﬁc receipt, stores it in a receipt buffer, and starts a timer; if the
node receives an explicit request to sample this packet before the timer expires, it emits the
trafﬁc receipt and stops the timer; when a timer expires, the node discards the corresponding
trafﬁc receipt. Trafﬁc sources can then locate where packets got lost or corrupted by examining
trafﬁc reports from the nodes. This is conceptually simple, but impractical to implement in
our context: a node located at the Internet core may observe millions of packets per second,
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and we are not aware of any network hardware with the capability to start and stop timers
with that frequency. Also, involving the end-hosts would require upgrading the end-hosts,
which would make deployment signiﬁcantly harder.
Subsequently, Zhang et al. proposed a packet sampling technique where routers store packet
ﬁngerprints and later a central controller sends explicit sampling requests to all the sampling
nodes by distributing a key that determines a sampling function [61]. The sampled packet
ﬁngerprints are then sent to the central server. Their approachwas designed for a local network
and would face scalability concerns if deployed in an inter-domain setting. We cannot imagine
a secure, scalable system where backbone routers handle controller disclosure messages for
individual packets. Also, the paper did not include any analysis that combines misbehavior,
accuracy and resources.
Beyond delayed disclosure, there exists extensive related work on fault localization [12, 32, 13,
62, 15]:
Packet Obituaries [12] is a proposed transparency framework where networks produce and
store a receipt for every single packet they observe. A modest extension of that protocol
would be conceptually straightforward— no sampling nor any packet processing beyond
receipt computation and management: each node could compute a receipt for every observed
packet. Then the monitor could be able to perform all its decisions w.r.t. aggregate G , with
better accuracy than our sampling algorithm, because it is able to compute the summarized
statistics on the entire packet population and not only a sample of it. Bad-receipt attacks can
be exposed on a per-packet basis: e.g. if node i computed a receipt for the packet, and node
o did not; then the monitor detects an inconsistency, it notiﬁes both involved nodes (hence,
if the inconsistency is the result of one node being detectably faulty, that node is exposed to
its peering node). Neutrality violations are detected with probability 1, because the monitor
computes the means accurately and the means cannot be forged because of the exposure to
the neighbors. Although the extended version of Packet Obituaries may be appealing, it makes
sense only in low-rate environments and cannot be used in our context. It requires storing
and disseminating per-packet receipts for the entire trafﬁc, which yields a forbidding resource
overhead in the high-rate environments that we consider (it requires an extravagant amount
of fast on-path memory–approx. 400 MB of SRAM for a packet rate of 14.88 Mpps) and leaves
no room to a participating domain to tune, according to network conditions the amount of
resources it devotes to reporting its performance. Even if we conﬁgured the network to emit
per-packet receipts only for one aggregateG , the resulting overhead could still be forbiddingly
high; for instance, if G is “all trafﬁc from content provider X that transits through ISP Y ” or
“all BitTorrent trafﬁc that transits through ISP Y ,” having each of Y ’s nodes emit a receipt for
every single such packet would be an overkill.
Another family of proposals is based on aggregated performance reports for entire aggregates,
as seen in the “Secure Sketch” [32], AudIt [13], and ShortMAC [62] papers. Such reports
provide approximate information about the trafﬁc aggregate, whereas a sample provides exact
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information about a speciﬁc packet. In the “Secure Sketch” protocol [32], a node aggregates
all the observed trafﬁc into a space-efﬁcient data structure and reports it to the source. In
AudIt [13], ISPs export performance information – aggregated at the granularity of TCP ﬂows –
back to the source. In ShortMAC [62], the routers maintain per-ﬂow counters to record the
number of packets originated from a given source and at the end of each measurement epoch,
the source retrieves the counter reports from all routers and the destination, via a secure
channel, to perform fault localization. These techniques were not designed with our goals and
constraints (no pre-deﬁned aggregates or per-aggregate state) in mind. It is unclear: (a) how
networks would agree on which aggregates to produce receipts for, and (b) what the resulting
memory requirements would be, given that all these techniques require per-aggregate or
per-ﬂow state. Furthermore, their coarser estimation granularity enables a node to hide
preferential treatment behind the aggregated performance metrics (e.g., average delay). On
the contrary, random sampling does not require a global consent of the networks on which
trafﬁc aggregates to report on, it inherently covers a wide variety of them. The monitor can
therefore deﬁne the aggregates as necessary, potentially with help from the source nodes,
but without affecting the operation of the rest of the network. Also, if properly enhanced
with retro-active mechanism (as we showed in Chapter 4), sampling can resist to preferential
treatment.
Subsequent work brought formal rigor and security guarantees to the idea of networks report-
ing on their own performance [15], even when intermediate nodes on the path misbehave.
This proposal shows that any fault can be localized to a link between two subsequent reporting
nodes—even when there is no centralized monitor, and networks may tamper both with
packet contents and with the receipts produced by other networks. However, it focuses on
fault localization for speciﬁc “paths” (in our context, a path would correspond to a ﬂow) and
require nodes to keep per-path state. The authors recognize that their results require active
cooperation (i.e. maintaining keys and agreeing on, and performing, cryptographic protocols)
from all of the intermediate nodes along the path. This may be problematic in the Internet,
where links operate at extremely high speeds, and intermediate nodes are owned by competing
business entities with little incentive to cooperate.
In addition to the differences described above, our work is different from all prior work on
fault localization [12, 13, 14, 15, 32, 60, 61, 62] in the way we approached bad-receipt attacks:
All proposals argue that the best a domain can achieve with a bad receipt attack is to shift
the blame for a lost or delayed packet to an inter-domain link; since an inter-domain link is
shared responsibility, the attack does not exonerate the culprit, hence there is no incentive
for a domain to launch it. For example, suppose domain y delivers packet p to domain x,
which drops it; both y and x sample p, but x suppresses the receipt produced for p at its
entry point, i.e., pretends that it never received p; since y produces a receipt for p but x does
not, the monitor concludes that p was dropped on the inter-domain link between y and
x. Whenever the monitor concludes that an inter-domain link between x and y introduces
certain loss/delay in aggregateG , the monitor attributes this loss to both x and y .
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We partially disagree with the “shifting-responsibility’ argument: while it holds when the
monitor cares only about the domains’ loss rate, things become more complicated when
reasoning about each and every packet with a Bernoulli random variable is not possible and
the distribution being estimated is not known in advance; which is what happens when the
monitor cares also about the domains’ delay. The problem is that the accuracy of a delay
estimate that the monitor computes depends on the variance of the delay distribution, and as
we proved in Chapter 3, a bad-receipt attack w.r.t. the variance is not always externalized to the
inter-domain links. Moreover, collusion attacks or other sophisticated attacks that manipulate
the summarizing delay estimates without manipulating each and every receipt, make this
problem more complex.
Instead of adopting the shifting-responsibility argument as is, we analyzed bad-receipt at-
tacks in a structured way that was based on the ideas of incentive-compatible mechanism
design [49]: we identiﬁed the decisions about loss and delay in which the monitor is interested,
and designed the decision mechanism in such a way that each domain’s reporting w.r.t. the
estimates is always truthful. In this way, externalization (which we term that we use for the
shifting-responsibility idea) was proved to be only the one part of the solution.
Coordinated measurements (different problem, related approaches):
Our work shares common ground with proposals for coordinated trafﬁc measurements inside
one domain [25, 40, 43], which fulﬁll different objectives: In [25], Dufﬁeld et al propose
Trajectory Sampling an implicitly coordinated method among routers for consistent sampling
and direct inference of packet trajectories. The sampling decisions are based on deterministic
hash functions over packets’ invariant part (i.e. those bits that do not change from bit to bit).
To reduce collection overhead, the authors use a second hash (instead of compression) to
label the huge variety of trajectories with a few bits and parameterize the hash functions in
a way that maximizes the expected fraction of unambiguous labels. In [40], Kompella et al
explore the problem of measuring ﬁne-grained latency and loss between any sender A and a
receiver B (segmented measurement). They propose the Lossy Difference Aggregator (LDA), a
low-overhead mechanism which aggregates timestamps of the sampled packets to overcome
the linear relationship between sample size and communication overhead. They make their
system resilient to packet loss using uniform consistent sampling similar to [25] and different
sampling probabilities in parallel. In [43], Lee et al propose Consistent NetFlow that utilizes
existing NetFlow architecture, which already reports the ﬁrst and last timestamps per-ﬂow,
and consistent sampling to ensure that two adjacent routers record the same ﬂows. They
introduce a Multiﬂow estimator that approximates the intermediate delay samples from other
background ﬂows to improve the per-ﬂow latency estimates compared to the naive estimator
that only uses actual ﬂow samples.
We build on the same idea of consistent sampling that all these proposals use and that was
introduced (to the best of our knowledge) in [65]: a packet is either sampled by all or none of
the nodes inside a network; sampling is performed by computing a digest over the immutable
81
Chapter 6. Related Work
packet content. Also, the estimation processes that we use for the monitor are quite similar
to theirs. However, that work was designed for single-domain management. Its target was to
aid trafﬁc engineering by also addressing the accuracy/overhead trade-off: reduce the data
of trafﬁc reports to meet processing, storage and bandwidth constraints, on the one hand,
and supply sufﬁciently accurate measurements for applications, on the other. None of those
proposals considers untrusted sampling nodes and therefore cannot be used in adversarial
environments, especially where prioritization attacks are possible.
Other relayed work on network measurements (common vision):
We share common vision with another interesting domain called network provenance [63, 64],
where a set of network nodes maintain a distributed provenance graph that records interesting
network events—potentially including packet arrivals and departures—and can be used for
diagnosis and forensics. However, this approach is mostly suitable for the control plane due
to its high overhead. We believe that our work could help the system scale: recording every
single packet arrival and departure is expensive; instead, the provenance graph could record
only arrivals and departures of a few representative packets—and our retro-active sampling
algorithm would ensure that these are indeed representative.
Last, there two more measurement systems that allow network diagnosis: Handigol et al. [35]
propose NetSight, an extensible platform that captures histories of every packet’s journey
through the intra-domain network and enables applications to concisely and ﬂexibly re-
trieve packet histories of interest; but, they do not consider malicious components. Liu et al.
propose UnivMon as a universal packet monitoring function [46], however, they assume a
non-adversarial environment.
Network tomography for topology inference:
For our work on topology obfuscation, we needed to identify the common ground of all the
state-of-the-art approaches in the area of network tomography for topology inference [30,
29, 56, 19, 28, 26, 27, 57]. All proposals start from the same fundamental idea: the level of
covariance between the delays experienced from a series of back-to-back packets that fol-
lowed two different intra-domain paths, gives information about the amount of shared logical
topology between those paths. And then, they provide ways to turn this information into
logical-topology reconstruction in two steps: ﬁrst they construct a tree topology between
any given node and the other nodes of the domain; second, the entire domain topology
is reconstructed with the help of tree-merging algorithms [20]. The ﬁrst step of this pro-
cess is the one that the approaches differ, as some of them use an agglomerative clustering
algorithm [27, 57, 16, 30, 29], and some others use maximum likelihood techniques [19]. Ag-
glomerative clustering resolves the hierarchical clustering of a set of objects with pairwise
similarity values by ﬁnding the maximum similarity element and merging the rows/columns
of the similarity matrix corresponding to those two end-hosts, then ﬁnding the next maximum
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element and merging those rows/columns of the covariance matrix to the new maximum ele-
ment. Maximum likelihood techniques use a global maximum-penalized likelihood criterion
for topology identiﬁcation, which is a global optimality criterion as opposed to the suboptimal,
pair-clustering strategies.
Our topology-obfuscating algorithms targeted the covariances instead of the topology-reconstruction
techniques: We craft the transparency receipts such that their delay covariance is always close
to 0 for all the domain’s pairs of intra-domain paths, and thus leak no information about the
domain’s topology.
Mechanism Design (our basis for incentive compatibility):
We build our incentive-compatible reporting (Chap. 3) on the ideas of game-theoretic mech-
anism design [49]. Mechanism design is a subﬁeld of economics that is concerned with the
question of how to incentivize agents (for us agents are the domains) to truthfully report their
private information, also known as their type. Given potentially non-truthful reports from the
agents, a mechanism (which in our case is owned by the monitor) determines a single joint
solution, and possibly additional monetary transfers to and from the agents. A mechanism is
said to be incentive compatible if it is always in the agents’ best interest to report their true
types. Our monitor’s decision function (§3.1) are similar to social choice functions: as a social
choice function aggregates the preferences of the different participants toward a single joint
decision, in the same way, our decision function aggregates the emitted information of the
participating domains toward a single decision about their performance. However, instead of
payments [34], the mechanism adds penalties to the domain’s rating/utility functions, so that
the domains maximize their utility by telling the truth.
More distantly related to our work from a game-theoretic perspective, is Regression Learning
studies that consider strategic agents [23, 53, 59, 17]: an analyst wants to construct a real-
valued function based on a training set of examples, where each example consists of an input
to the function and its corresponding output, but each agent holds as private information an
individual distribution over the input space and values for the points in the support of this
distribution, and measures the quality of a regression function with respect to this data. That
work offers more rigorous results than ours, but it is not applicable in our context. The goal of
the work is to do well with respect to a statistical estimate (e.g. the average) of the individual
points of view–not all of them–and it is often assumed that the precisions with which the
agents perturb their reported values are known to the analyst.
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7 Conclusions
We proposed a network transparency system, where domains produce receipts for the trafﬁc
they observe, and independent monitors collect each domain’s receipts and use them to
estimate the domain’s loss/delay performance and detect neutrality violations with respect
to various trafﬁc aggregates. Our design was studied in an adversarial context, where both
domains and monitors may misbehave for different reasons: the domains may launch bad-
receipt or prioritization attacks, while the monitor may try to infer the domains’ topologies
using network tomography.
We proposed solutions that make the system robust to misbehavior:
First we proposed a performance and neutrality decision-making mechanism that is provably
robust to bad-receipt attacks, where domains manipulate their receipts to cause the monitors
make decisions that are to their advantage. Our mechanism was structured on the principles of
game-theoretic mechanism design, which enables truthfulness using payments. We designed
the monitors’ decisions such that the each domain’s performance rating includes loss/delay
estimates that the domain cannot control through its receipts and are worsen when the
domain launches a bad-receipt attack.
Second, we proposed a packet sampling algorithm that prevents the network node that
performs the sampling from treating the sampled packets preferentially. Our algorithm builds
on delayed disclosure—where the sampling function is disclosed to the sampling node with
a delay—and enhances it with quiet periods, during which sampling is disallowed, and a
disclosure process that adapts to each ﬂow’s packet rate. These two techniques together
ensure that a misbehaving domain that tries to bias the sample to exaggerate its performance
instead provably worsens its perceived delay performance. Our algorithm can be conﬁgured
to provably emit enough receipts to achieve a desired accuracy within a desired time interval,
while using the minimum amount of data-path memory necessary—which ends up being a
few MB of data-path memory per 10Gbps of forwarding capacity.
Third, we proposed two receipt-generating algorithms that prevent tomographic approaches
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from inferring a domain’s topology. Our algorithms build on the idea of scrambling the
reported packet delays of each intra-domain path, so that all pairwise covariances of the path
delays are (close to) 0. This causes any tomographic approach to construct only direct logical
links among the domain’s nodes, which gives no information about the internal topology.
Also, since the sample delay distribution is reported truthfully, the quality of the monitors’
statistical estimation is not penalized.
Limitations and Reality Check
We state the limitations of our system in the form of critical questions:
Can we compute statistics for arbitrary aggregates? No. We can compute statistics for any
aggregate of signiﬁcant volume, but not aggregates that consist of a few packets, e.g., a single
short TCP or UDP ﬂow. To reason about the statistical signiﬁcance of a loss estimate that is
based on sampling, we have to model the estimated loss as either i.i.d. or Gilbert, which is is
reasonable only for large aggregates.
Can we catch SLA violations against end-users? Yes, but that requires deploying nodes at the
user end, for instance, collocated with users’ DSL or cable modems. Involving the end-users is
unavoidable if we want to reason about their network experience. Even lightweight techniques
that do not require any in-network infrastructure [24, 54] do require active user participation.
In our examples and evaluation, we consider the scenario where the users of our system are
edge networks like eyeball ISPs or enterprise/campus networks.
Why would networks agree to produce receipts? Any entity—e.g., government or regulatory
body—that wants network innovation has an incentive to push for transparency [41]. If such
an entity has the authority to enact, e.g., neutrality regulations (and apparently many do [9]),
it also has the authority to require infrastructure that leads to transparency. All this aside, it is
possible that, once a low-cost transparency system is shown to be feasible, some ISPs will want
to participate in order to showcase their qualities, i.e., the market will drive deployment—but
we have not shown this.
How can the nodes be implemented? Either as a bump-in-the-wire appliance or integrated
in router linecards, potentially as a NetFlow or sﬂow extension. Our algorithm has standard
hardware requirements, e.g., hashing of packet headers and timestamp computation. We
describe a hardware-friendly implementation in our technical report.
How can the monitor be implemented? As a set of controllers, akin to a scalable SDN control
plane [6]: each controller collects receipts from speciﬁc nodes/domains, and each node knows
how to reach its controller and communicate with it securely. Such an implementation is a
non-trivial engineering problem, but there is nothing fundamentally new in implementing a
scalable logically centralized controller that collects reports from network nodes.
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A Appendix
A.1 Basic Delayed Disclosure Algorithm
Algorithm 5 BasicDelayedDisclosure (p)
pˆ non-mutable content of packet p
Receipt() constructs a receipt
DiscHash() hash function
DiscRange subset of DiscHash’s range
Hash() hash function
Range subset of Hash’s range
1: rec′ ←Receipt(pˆ,currentTime)
2: Add rec′ to receipt buffer.
3: if DiscHash
(
pˆ
) ∈DiscRange then
4: Emit receipt rec′.
5: for all receipts rec in receipt buffer with
6: rec.ﬂowID= rec′.ﬂowID do
7: Remove rec from receipt buffer.
8: if Hash
(
rec.digest,rec′.digest
) ∈Range then
9: Emit receipt rec.
10: end if
11: end for
12: end if
See Algorithm 5.
A.2 Monitor Algorithm
See Algorithm 6.
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Algorithm 6 PerformanceEstimation (ﬂowID)
Ri all receipts for ﬂowID emitted by node i
Ro all receipts for ﬂowID emitted by node o
1: intervalStart ← 0.
2: numPktsIn← 0. numPktsOut ← 0.
3: delaySamples← {}.
4: for each disclosure receipt ri∗ inRi do
5: intervalEnd← ri∗.t ime.
6: Output “Time interval:
7: intervalStart to intervalEnd”.
8: Remove ri∗ fromRi.
9: Find disclosure receipt ro∗ inRo
10: with ro∗.digest = ri∗.digest.
11: if (none found) then
12: Output “No estimate: disclosure packet lost”.
13: continue
14: end if
15: Remove ro∗ fromRo.
16: if (ro∗.l ate) then
17: Output “No estimate: late disclosure”.
18: continue
19: end if
20: for each receipt ri inRi
21: with ri.timestamp< ri∗.timestamp do
22: Remove ri fromRi.
23: if ri∗.timestamp− ri.timestamp> κ+μ then
24: ++ numPktsIn.
25: end if
26: end for
27: for each receipt ro inRo
28: with ro.timestamp< ro∗.timestamp do
29: Remove ro fromRo.
30: Find receipt ri from node i
31: with ri.digest = ro.digest.
32: if (none found AND ro∗.timestamp− ro.timestamp> κ+μ) then
33: Output “Potentially inaccurate estimate:
34: reordering or jitter.”
35: else
36: ++ numPktsOut.
37: Add to delaySamples ro.timestamp− ri.timestamp.
38: end if
39: end for
40: Output loss estimate numPktsIn−numPktsOutnumPktsIn .
41: Output delay samples delaySamples.
42: intervalStart ← intervalEnd.
43: numPktsIn← 0. numPktsOut ← 0.
44: delaySamples← {}.
45: end for88
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